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Abstract
The CubeSat pico-satellite is gaining popularity in both the educa-
tional and aerospace industries. Due to a lack of experience and con-
strained hardware capabilities, most of the university missions have
been educational in nature. Cal Poly’s project, PolySat, has gained
significant experience from the launch of five CubeSats and has de-
signed an entirely new hardware platform based on the knowledge
gained from these missions. This hardware is a significant upgrade
from what the previous missions used and has greatly increased the
capabilities of the software, including supporting the use of the open
source operating system Linux.
Leveraging the previous PolySat experience, a new design approach
has been followed for the development of a fault tolerant and flexible
software architecture. As a result, a set of processes and custom li-
braries that run within Linux have been designed and implemented.
Furthermore, an emphasis has been placed on fault tolerance with two
features: a software watchdog and digital command signing capability.
Lastly, a survey of related CubeSat projects and software fault toler-
ance papers has been conducted to determine that this new system is
sufficient to meet the desired goals.
To my parents, Sue and George Manyak, who’ve never discouraged
me from trying anything and made this college experience possible.
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1Introduction
1.1 CubeSats
CubeSat class spacecraft have become increasingly popular since their introduc-
tion in 1999 by Cal Poly professor Dr. Jordi Puig-Suari and professor Bob Twiggs,
then at Stanford [1], thanks to their limited volume of 10cm3 [2].The standardized
size requires some creativity but more importantly it makes the cost of develop-
ment and launch relatively affordable for nearly any organization looking to build
a spacecraft because it resulted in a standardized deployment device, the Poly
Pico-satellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD) [2]. This low cost has resulted in the
CubeSat’s prevalence in both the educational and private sectors. This is es-
pecially true at Cal Poly, whose multidisciplinary satellite project, PolySat, has
been at the forefront of the CubeSat community since the specification was first
introduced.
1.2 PolySat
PolySat has launched a total of 5 CubeSats since the start of the program in 1999:
CP1 through CP4 and CP6. All of the satellites after CP1 used the same flight
software, with minor revisions. The overall system was designed with more of an
emphasis on hardware than software modularity, and thus the software was fairly
simple, with no operating system and mission specific components were frequently
intermixed with basic functionality. Although this system was relatively effective
at meeting the requirements of these missions, far more ambitious missions are
1
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now regularly being proposed to the PolySat team.
Recently, PolySat was approached with a new mission, LightSail-1, for which a
more powerful and robust avionics platform was desired. This presented PolySat
with the [funding] opportunity to leverage the experience gained from the first
generation platform and build something entirely new. The new base hardware
consists of a small number of very capable, yet low power, components all on
a single board. This type of design is suited perfectly for the CubeSat because
it minimized volume and maximized potential payloads, thanks to both the im-
proved computing power and the available space.
1.3 CubeSat Software
At the earliest stages of the design, the previous software team was consulted
to determine what areas could be best improved upon to facilitate development
since the current team had mostly been involved in modifying and extending the
existing platform. The most common suggestion was to find a platform that had
significant community support and pre-existing code that can be utilized. As
a result, the new microprocessor was chosen with support for the open source
operating system, Linux. This selection has far-reaching implications for the
software architecture; some concepts from the past designs can be preserved, but
a wholly new software system should be implemented to maximize the benefit.
A CubeSat software architecture is vital to the development of the spacecraft
and careful attention must be given to each design decision. A proper Cube-
Sat software system will require minimal, if any, revisions between each unique
mission and thus enable quick turn around times to support the demands of the
customer and launch scheduling. During the design of a software architecture, it
is important to consider this concept because once a hardware platform has been
established, updated software may be the only significant component necessary
to support a new mission.
The architecture can easily dictate the success of the entire mission, as well.
This is particularly true in CubeSats because they are highly volume constrained
systems that are encouraged to utilize minimal hardware to increase payload
volume. This differs significantly from the typical, large satellite that would
include a variety of redundant components in order to protect itself against the
2
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harsh environment of space where ionizing radiation can cause bit flips or even
stuck bits [3]. Thus, it is critical that the software architecture provides features
that insure reliable operation, in spite of potential radiation effects.
These two goals are the driving forces behind the design of the new PolySat
software architecture, which aims to be both extensible and fault tolerant.
1.4 Thesis Organization
This thesis details the new software system and is organized as follows. Chap-
ter 2 revisits the first generation platform and some of the lessons learned from
the software. Chapter 3 describes the new design guidelines, requirements, and
philosophies for the new software system. Chapter 4 details the system architec-
ture, focusing on the two major layers of the new system: processes and libraries.
Chapter 5 discusses the two primary fault tolerant features of the system includ-
ing their goals, requirements, implementation, and results. Chapter 6 looks at
a number of other CubeSat projects by analyzing and comparing their software
systems to the one presented in this thesis. Chapter 7 looks at various technical
and published papers discussing different fault tolerant mechanisms that were
considered for this design. Chapter 8 summarizes the results and discusses the
implementation progress and future work.
1.5 Scope of Thesis
This thesis discusses the inspiration and the design of the new flexible and fault
tolerant software architecture for PolySat’s newly designed avionics hardware
platform, in addition to a review and comparison of a number of other Cube-
Sat projects. The design of the modules is mostly limited to the high level and
conceptual design; the watchdog and cryptography components are the only sig-
nificant aspects completely designed and implemented as part of this thesis. This
is primarily due to the considerable number of PolySat students who have partic-
ipated in the implementation and low level design of some of the other modules
thus far.
3
1. INTRODUCTION
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2First Generation Software
Architecture
PolySat’s first generation software architecture was based on Cal Poly’s second
satellite’s flight software and was expanded to be more generic for the purpose
of supporting future missions more easily [4]. This software obtained flight ex-
perience on the CP3, CP4, and CP6 spacecraft with varying degrees of success.
The last spacecraft to use it will be the CP5 mission, which is intended to launch
sometime in mid-2012.
2.1 Design
Due to the tightly coupled nature of hardware and software, it is important to
understand the hardware design first. The overall platform design was built
with a fault tolerance architecture mostly by utilizing redundant hardware. The
reason for this choice is that the majority of the components were inexpensive,
in both cost and power consumption, for redundancy to be possible [5]. The
biggest example of this is on the Command and Data Handling (C&DH) board,
which was comprised of 3 separate PIC18F6720 microcontrollers interfaced via
I2C. One controller was responsible for the C&DH related processing, including
interfacing with EEPROMs for non-volatile storage and the payload, while the
other two primarily dealt with the communications of the spacecraft, each running
the exact same software. The C&DH was responsible for toggling between the
two communication chains. A generalized block diagram of the first generation
5
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hardware is shown in Figure 2.1.
C&DH 
Processor
EEPROM EEPROM
RF Switch
Payload
Comm 
Processor
TxRx
Comm 
Processor
TxRx
I²C
GPIO
GPIO
GPIO
Figure 2.1: First Generation Hardware Block Diagram - This figure shows the
redundant communication systems and the memory/payload interfaces to the C&DH mi-
croprocessor of the first generation system.
A simple, interrupt-based software architecture is used in all of the controller
software: a while(1) loop continually checks status flags, which are set in inter-
rupt service routines. These interrupts can be triggered by one of two things: an
I2C message, or a timer expiration.
Typically, there is a fast timer, for events that are very frequent or require
very accurate deadlines, and a slower timer, for less frequent events with looser
deadline requirements. Inside of the timer interrupt handler, timer generated
interrupts are counted until the number of overflows to meet the desired time
have occurred and then a global flag is set, which will be read in the main loop.
2.1.1 Modes of Operation
The entire spacecraft has three primary modes of operation: pre-ops, normal-ops,
and contingency. Although the modes of operation have the same names for both
the communications and C&DH controllers, they are selected independently.
Pre-ops is the mode in which both controllers operate when the spacecraft
is first ejected from the P-POD. In this state, the spacecraft merely collects
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telemetry data and beacons it at a regular rate, until a command is uplinked
from the ground station. Once a command has been received, the communications
processor will move into the normal ops mode for the remainder of the mission.
A contingency mode was originally part of the design, where the communications
processor could control the entire spacecraft, however, this was never implemented
in a flight unit.
As for the C&DH processor, normal ops mode will only be entered after a
specific command is sent up. It was designed such that normal ops enabled
autonomous transmissions to trigger at a higher rate and it also allowed other,
more complex commands to be executed (i.e. those dealing with the payload
or attitude control). The C&DH will return to the pre-ops state after a certain
amount of time (typically on the order of days), as to reset the beacon rate and
essentially stay in a lower power mode.
2.1.2 Communications Controller
Both the communication software and hardware subsystem were mostly developed
as a senior project by Chris Noe [5]. This software has remained mostly untouched
through all of the CP flights due to its complexity and relative effectiveness.
Traditional ground stations utilize a hardware terminal node controller (TNC),
which is the radio control interface, and this design was used in some of the earlier
CubeSat communication systems, however, this requires significant power and
volume. For CP2 the more appropriate solution was found to be using a software
TNC instead. The primary function of a TNC is to forward data to and from the
transceiver. In this system, the data is typically going to be sent to the C&DH
controller. Each communication controller is interfaced to its own transceiver via
a two wire bus and will toggle a GPIO to indicate to the C&DH that data has
been received. The code for the transceiver driver is very complex because of the
intermixing of a “bit-bang” protocol and the communication encoding scheme,
which was required due to the speed-sensitive nature of this interface.
The communication controller examines the command byte of each received
packet so that a few basic commands can be executed before forwarding the
data to the C&DH. For example, a command can be executed by the C&DH to
reset the communication controller. There is also a command that can be issued
to cause the communication controller to transmit a basic morse-code beacon,
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which can be requested up to 10 times and can be useful for tuning the radios to
find the transmitting frequency of the satellite. Some missions also implemented
a command to enable the payload from this controller; even if the C&DH has
failed, this allows a one-off experiment to be triggered.
2.1.3 Command and Data Handling Controller
The C&DH controller was responsible for a wide variety of aspects on the system
including spacecraft telemetry data collection, attitude determination and control
experiment execution, and high level communication system and payload control.
The precise functionality evolved and changed on a mission-by-mission basis, but
these overall goals generally remained the same.
All three satellites had autonomous sensor data collection with a customizable
rate at the granularity of the lower speed timer interrupt. The sensor data was
collected and stored in I2C EEPROMs, which limited the total amount of stored
data to 256KB. In order to deal with this limitation, the operator could issue a
command to the spacecraft to treat the EEPROMs as circular buffers, or stop
the saving of data after the capacity has been reached.
The sensors were divided up into distinct groups to allow for different rates
for each, based on the needs of the mission. There was also an I2C real time clock
device on the C&DH board, which was used to add timestamps to the sensor
snapshots.
Furthermore, the C&DH was responsible for controlling and monitoring the
other major subsystems it was connected to: communications, attitude determi-
nation and control (ADCS), power, and payload. One of the timed events on the
C&DH was toggling between the two redundant communication chains, so that in
the event of one failing, the other would be used soon afterwards and communica-
tion would only be temporarily interrupted. Though the ADCS functionality was
limited on the most recent versions of the legacy flight software, the C&DH was
responsible for executing an attitude control algorithm, B-dot, for de-tumbling
the CubeSat. As for the power subsystem, the C&DH mostly played a supervi-
sor role by interfacing with battery monitors and recording voltage and current
levels of the batteries. Lastly, the C&DH was usually interfaced with a payload
subsystem controller and would forward ground station commands intended for
it.
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2.1.4 I2C Fault Tolerance Upgrade
The functionality of the I2C bus is imperative to the success of this system because
of the link between the C&DH and communication controllers. In order to make
this connection more robust, a CRC was added to each inter-process message
as part of a senior project [6]. The primary benefit of this was that unintended
messages should no longer be acted on, which could potentially put the spacecraft
into an unintended state. As a result, a local retry was also implemented so that
commands that originated from the ground did not have to be resent. This feature
also enabled the collection of I2C telemetry, allowing for further characterization
of the bus in space.
2.2 Results
The three spacecraft that have flown thus far were using very similar versions of
the software and hardware. CP3 and CP6 shared the same primary mission, but
CP6 had some receive sensitivity improvements in an attempt to improve uplink
from the ground station, plus an additional payload from Naval Research Labs.
CP4 was a re-fly of CP2, which did not reach orbit. The CP5 spacecraft, which
is manifested on the ELaNa VI mission, is slated to be launched in mid-2012 and
uses a modified C&DH board with only a single communication processor and
radio.
2.2.1 CP3
CP3 was launched in April 2007 and successfully demonstrated a majority of the
basic functionality. As of writing this thesis, it still regularly communicates with
the Cal Poly ground station, but the communication is mostly one way because
uplink is very difficult to achieve as a result of very poor receive sensitivity. Un-
fortunately, this limited the uplink to simple commands and payload operations
were never able to be completed.
2.2.2 CP4
The CP4 spacecraft went into orbit with CP3, but unfortunately after a short
time it experienced a critical failure preventing C&DH or payload commands from
9
2. FIRST GENERATION SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
being executed. It was suspected that an I2C bus failure was to blame [6], which
would have disabled communications between the C&DH and communication
controllers and effectively shut down the spacecraft.
2.2.3 CP6
PolySat’s most recently flown spacecraft, CP6, was launched in May 2009. CP6’s
improved receive sensitivity resulted in arguably the most effective PolySat mis-
sion. The majority of the command set was able to be transmitted and executed
on the spacecraft, including the demonstration of the B-dot de-tumbling algo-
rithm.
CP6 was also the first mission to heavily involve amateur radio operators
around the world. This was primarily thanks to a freely distributed program
that decoded packets and also sent the data back to a central database at Cal
Poly. In fact, the data sent to this database through this program was over double
the amount of data of Cal Poly, based on numbers from a couple months after
launch [7].
Unfortunately, a few months after the launch, CP6 stopped responding for a
significant period of time and as of April 2011, only one of the communication
processors responds to simple commands, and there is no response from C&DH
commands.
CP6 was the only mission thus far to fly with the I2C telemetry collection
enabled. The gathered results over the lifetime of the mission are shown in
Figure 2.2. The data shows that there was an approximately 8% error rate in the
bus transactions. Although this number is higher than ideal, it does not seem to
definitively indicate that the I2C bus is the source of the CP4 and CP6 failures.
2.3 Lessons Learned
Multiple generations of students have used this architecture in CubeSat designs
since it was first developed and although minor improvements were made for
each new mission, there have always been some lingering concerns. The most
problematic of these existed as a result of the development processes rather than
the design.
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Figure 2.2: I2C bus event data from CP6 - Inset in upper left shows only the CRC
error and bus fault event counters. Time progresses left-to-right, but not proportionally
due to periods of time when no data was downlinked.
2.3.1 Development Environment
One of the most common source of problems was the software provided by the
microcontroller manufacturer. For example, the host machine seems to sponta-
neously lose communication with the interface to the target microcontroller and
the IDE will provide only cryptic error messages that sometimes can be fixed by
restarting the software, but other times require a full system reboot. These type
of issues are especially prevalent when attempting to use the single-step debugger,
which itself is an appreciated option, but is not always worth the trouble when
these problems arise so regularly.
Unfortunately, the problems with the development environment did not stop
there. When re-imaging the host machines in the lab, a slightly newer compiler
was installed and resulted in completely non-functional software. This implies
that there are strong dependencies to the version of the compiler and thus would
require PolySat to stay with this, now quite old, version of the compiler in order
to maintain backwards compatibility with the old projects.
Based on these issues that we have had with the development software and
compiler, the general consensus in the lab was to move away from the PIC mi-
crocontroller platform.
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2.3.2 Hardware versus Software Modularity
A significant strategy of the first generation system design was to favor hardware
modularity over software modularity, so that fault tolerance through redundant
hardware could be provided. Hardware redundancy is a fairly common design
in full size spacecraft and one of the common concerns about CubeSats is they
do not support such designs very easily. However, PolySat and other universities
(see Chapter 6) operational history have shown there is negligible benefit with
hardware redundancy, at the cost of significant complexity added to the system.
Specifically with the PolySat system there has been no known event where the
C&DH was able to continue operating while one of the communication chains
had failed.
2.3.3 Modular Command System
The command handling module in the first generation software architecture ex-
isted entirely in one source file, based around a massive switch statement. Each
command had its own case and often all of the code to execute the command
was there, rather than making a function call. There was also a large amount of
repeated code for transmitting negative acknowledgements upon incorrect usage
of commands.
As the capabilities increased with each revision, so did the file size: with 40
commands, it was nearly 1500 lines for CP3 and then for CP6, it grew to almost
2000 lines with 60 commands. This file violated numerous software engineering
guidelines, but its growth could not be stopped because it was already deeply
ingrained in the software’s architecture. The lesson from this behemoth of a
source file is that emphasis should be placed on a modular command system
from the initial design because it is guaranteed that commands will be added for
future missions.
2.3.4 Collect More Telemetry
A lesson that was learned in part before CP6’s launch was that more teleme-
try is a good thing, as demonstrated by the additional I2C telemetry collection.
However, there’s no reason to stop there; this policy should be applicable to any
12
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interface, software or hardware. With a larger variety of telemetry sources, the
characterization and debugging capabilities are vastly increased.
13
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3Second Generation Software
Design Approach
To support the second generation software design, an updated set of guidelines,
requirements, and philosophies were created. These were developed as a culmina-
tion of the experience from developing and utilizing the first generation system,
in addition to some completely new concepts as a result of new mission proposals
and improved hardware capabilities.
3.1 Design Guidelines
Two major goals of the CubeSat platform are to be inexpensive and responsive.
In order to support these goals, it is necessary for the CubeSat developer to have
a flexible hardware and software system. PolySat refers to the combination of
the basic electronics packages (power and computing) and a standard software
platform as the avionics system. It is important that all of these components
are flexible so that a minimum amount of time and money is spent for each new
mission re-designing the basic architecture. A component whose importance is
seemingly often over-looked in the CubeSat community is the software architec-
ture, which this work is solely focused on designing.
The primary goal of this software architecture is to provide a design that is
both extensible and robust, in order to support the overall goal of having a flexible
CubeSat avionics platform. In order to meet this goal, there are a few rules that
guide the design of the software system: a flexible and effective command set
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must be provided, all major software components need to be aware of radiation
events, and the more telemetry collected, the better.
The method of interaction with the CubeSat after it has been launched is
through commands, which is a message sent from an external source that is
intended to trigger some type of action and is sent from a ground station. A
ground station is the location at which data can be transmitted over the air to
the spacecraft. Commands can also be intra-satellite, from one software module
to another. Both sources of commands can achieve the same results, such as
starting an experiment or change a parameter. As a rule, the majority of the
parameters of the different aspects of the spacecraft should be easily modified
through a command.
The next design guideline is that all components should be aware of potential
radiation events. This is important because of the effects the space environment
can have on the spacecraft and ultimately the software. Radiation events, such as
Single Event Upsets (SEU) that typically result in bit flips [3], can necessitate the
restart of software modules or even the entire processor, when detected. What this
means for the software modules themselves, is that they need to be able to tolerate
potentially unwarned termination or restarting. Mechanisms like storing state
information in non-volatile memory can help reduce the issues that could arise
from unexpected termination. Software modules need to contain the necessary
storage and recovery mechanisms in order to be able operate in the unpredictable
environment of space.
The last guideline states that the more telemetry collected, the happier the
mission operators and system developers will be. Often, only the minimum
amount of telemetry is collected, and can make failures very difficult to diagnose
because the necessary information was just not available, as was the case with
CP4 (discussed in Section 2.2),. This problem can be avoided by preemptively
collecting all potentially useful telemetry and providing the option to downlink it.
Hopefully, if everything works as intended, the information will not be necessary.
However, in the event of a failure, the telemetry can be used to diagnose the
problem. Thus, all modules are responsible for collecting relevant and important
telemetry.
These guidelines have been generated as a result of experience with the pre-
vious generation system and a survey of other CubeSat software architectures
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(Chapter 6). They have been emphasized in the new software design in an at-
tempt to avoid requiring significant revisions to the core components, in order to
add these type of features during the lifespan of the project. In general, the less
the platform has to be revised, the easier it will be to use for different missions.
3.2 Requirements
The requirements for the new software system are driven mostly by previous
experience and the general goals for the new system. However, since the second
generation platform is being developed in parallel with some of the missions that
plan to utilize it, LightSail-1 [8] and CP7 [9], some of their requirements have
served as guides, as well. The requirements are separated into functional and
non-functional, where the functional requirements are those that the software
system must be able to accomplish when it is completed, and the non-functional
are items that must be considered and supported throughout the design and its
life span.
3.2.1 Functional
A few basic functional requirements exist for this software system. The majority
of these address the required operations of the spacecraft itself. These require-
ments are small in number because there are only a small set of functions that
the satellite must be able to complete for all types of missions. It is a relatively
simple task to derive the functional requirements for a single mission. However,
it is a much more complex problem when considering a larger number of missions
and the common components must be found to facilitate optimal reuse, which is
what is required when designing a platform.
First and foremost, it is required that the system must also have the capa-
bility to periodically collect telemetry and store it in non-volatile storage. This
requirement enables the spacecraft operator to have the capability of downloading
a more detailed history that may not be available from just beacon data.
The next requirement is that the system must have a beaconing capability.
A beacon is a periodic broadcast of vital telemetry data, which can be used for
tracking the spacecraft after its been put into orbit and also provides valuable
information without requiring a specific command.
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Along the same lines, the system also must have the capability to transmit
AX.25 packets, at least for the first revision, because the existing ground station
infrastructure at Cal Poly supports this protocol. This requirement exists pri-
marily because PolySat does not have the funding to upgrade the ground station
to support other protocols that may be more efficient. Moreover, it is commonly
supported by amateur radio ground stations around the world that can provide
additional downlink opportunities and have been vital in data collection for past
PolySat missions (see Section 2.2.3).
To support the use of the spacecraft and these functions, there are also a
few vital commands that must be implemented. These include resetting the
spacecraft, changing the rate of telemetry collection, downlinking the telemetry,
and changing the rate of beacon transmission.
Lastly, the system must be able to execute these commands either immediately
or at some time in the future. Commonly, certain events may need to occur at a
time when the satellite is not passing over the ground station, meaning that no
uplink is available. In order to enable this type of event scheduling, the system
needs to be able to store commands and execute them a specified amount of time
later (either as a timestamp or time delta). The optimal support for command
scheduling would include both an offset from time of uplink or a time stamp.
3.2.2 Non-Functional
There are also numerous non-functional requirements for the new software system
design, which are divided into system, process, and personnel related. These
requirements are very important to the platform because they detail all of the non-
behavior factors of the system. A particular emphasis has been placed on those
requirements dealing with development on the platform because if the platform
is simple to develop for, it is more likely the next generation of PolySat students
will need to continue to use it.
Prior to the overall design of the software architecture discussed in this thesis,
both the hardware and software operating environments had been selected. The
software will run on a AT91SAM9G20 microprocessor, which is an ARM9-based
system on a chip that is clocked at 400MHz. Supporting this chip is 64MB of
SDRAM, a 16MB non-volatile phase change memory, and 512MB of non-volatile
NAND flash memory. The size of these memory chips will potentially scale with
18
3.2 Requirements
future mission needs because of the variety of available drop-in replacements since
they are fairly standard packages. For example, 128MB SDRAM chips that are a
drop in replacement for the existing chip have been found, in the event a mission
requires more volatile memory. There is also a microSD slot, which can add up
to 32GB of storage, at the time of this work. This system has been measured to
require approximately 180 mW while the CPU is idle and about 300 mW when
processing a workload that requires frequent access to the SDRAM.
Other important hardware components include two hardware watchdog timers
(WDT): one internal to the processor and another that is external. The internal
one has a shorter maximum timeout of 16 seconds and triggers a soft reset (only
the processor is rebooted); whereas the external watchdog has a longer timeout
of 60 seconds and results in a hard reset of the entire spacecraft by temporarily
removing power from all components. A block diagram of the hardware configu-
ration is shown in Figure 3.1.
AT91SAM9G20
Phase 
Change 
Memory
SPISDRAM
NAND Flash 
Memory
Parallel Bus
8
32
microSD 
Card
MMC
External 
Watchdog 
Timer
GPIO
System 
Reset 
Circuitry
Internal 
WDT
Figure 3.1: Second Generation Hardware Block Diagram - This figure shows
the new processor, memory, and hardware watchdog configuration. The memories are on
different types of buses: SDRAM and NAND Flash are on a high-speed parallel bus, phase
change memory on a SPI bus, and the micro-SD card is connected via the MMC bus.
The microprocessor was chosen because a port of the Linux operating system
already existed for it, which was sought out due to the the wide variety of open
source software and extensive community support that is available for free. As
a result of choosing Linux for the base software operational environment, the
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software produced from this thesis exists primarily as libraries and processes that
run in user space.
The system requirements cover the non-functional characteristics of the soft-
ware architecture, and they are itemized in Table 3.1. The first set of system
requirements deal with the performance as it relates to time and space. Fortu-
nately, none of the functional requirements of the system necessitate hard real-
time deadline capabilities because the periodic functions of the satellite, such as
the beacon, do not require high temporal accuracy to be useful. The alternative
to this is being able to meet soft deadlines, which do not require strict timing to
be correct and appropriately has been chosen as the minimum time performance
requirement.
In addition to performance, there are also some space requirements for the
code and data storage on the satellite. Phase change memory (PCM) technology
is multiple orders of magnitude more radiation tolerant than NAND Flash [10],
thus the boot code and related software must require less than 16MB of storage
so that it does not exceed the total storage available in PCM. The remainder of
the flight software must fit in the 512MB of NAND flash. The entire amount of
microSD card storage can be used for data storage.
The next group of system requirements describe the general characteristics.
The software should maximize the uptime of the system, so that a link with
the satellite can be established whenever it passes over a ground station that is
attempting contact. Furthermore, the system should be robust to the common
radiation events so that it is capable of providing this reliability guarantee. The
primary issue that can prevent operational uptime is single event upsets (SEUs)
and single event latch-ups (SELs), which are due to ionizing radiation in space;
thus, the system must be able to detect and react to these events. SEUs can be
recovered from by refreshing the affected memory bit, but SELs require power to
be removed from the component to allow enough time for the power plane of the
integrated circuit to return to ground [11].
Another group of requirements deal with the correctness guarantee that the
system can offer. For this system, only the intended commands should be ex-
ecuted in order to avoid putting the spacecraft into an unintended state. Each
software module must also be tested and validated to guarantee that it executes
the correct operations upon receiving a command. The next requirement is also
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Requirement Group # Name Details
Operational Environment
1.1.1 Hardware 400MHz AT91SAM9G20, 64MB RAM
1.1.2 Software Linux compatible
Performance
1.2.1 Time Soft real-time deadlines
1.2.2 Space 16MB boot s/w, 512MB other file system data
General Characteristics
1.3.1 Reliability Maximize uplink time
1.3.2 Robustness Autonomous recovery from SEUs and SELs
1.3.4 Correctness Only intended commands will be executed
1.3.5 Security Other groundstation commands limited
1.3.6 Extensibility Simple for future developers to add/modify
1.3.7 Power Minimize power consumption when inactive
Table 3.1: Non-Functional System Requirements
related to commands: the system must be secure enough to ensure commands
that have been corrupted by SEUs or have been sent from unauthorized ground
stations will not be executed.
The last two general system requirements are extensibility and power versus
performance. Extensibility is a very important aspect of the software system so
that the system can adapt as the needs of PolySat change based on the missions.
Thus, it must be straightforward to add new modules and features. As for power
versus performance, the system has very few compute bound aspects so perfor-
mance is not typically an issue, but power definitely can be, since the typical
one unit CubeSat has a power budget of about 1.5 watts per orbit. The software
needs to be aware of the power state of the system and do what it can to regulate
power consumption when necessary.
The process requirements specify those related to the development on the
platform and are shown in Table 3.2. For overall development on the system, the
goal is to enable a 6 month turn around time for new missions. If the system
is appropriately constructed, the developer should spend the majority of the
time working on the payload software rather than modifying base system code to
support it. Furthermore, since the developers are students, all development tools
and environments should be free so that there is no base cost to the organization
or the developer. This requirement is met fairly easily thanks to the numerous
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# Name Details
2.1 Development Time Enable 6 month mission turn around
2.2 Development Cost Free development tools/environment
2.3 Standards Conformance PolySat coding standards
2.4 Testing and Validation Black-box demo & reviewed by colleagues
Table 3.2: Non-Functional Process Requirements
free tools available for development on the Linux operating system.
The last process requirements specify the acceptance procedure for flight code.
First and foremost, all code should be written following the pre-exiting PolySat
coding standard (Appendix A), which enables Doxygen generated documentation
and will result in a consistent coding style. The developer is responsible for
validating any internal functionality to him or herself, but upon completion two
different events must occur: a functional demonstration to a senior member of
the PolySat software team and a formal code review. After the functionality of
the code has been verified, the developer should ensure the code is up to the
coding standards of requirement 2.3, and execute a formal code review with a
few members of the software team. There is no required experience level of the
reviewers because it is a mostly an aesthetic review to insure the code meets the
coding standards. This code review format also existed prior to the development
of this software architecture and the entire review process is explained in detail
in Appendix B.
The last set of requirements deal with those related to personnel and are sum-
marized in Table 3.3. These requirements are relatively unique to the PolySat
organization because all of our developers are students who are mostly volunteers
and work on the project in addition to their coursework. Due to this educational
environment that does not have a strict time commitment, the requirements for
developers are fairly limited and basic. Specifically, there should not be any ma-
jor credentials required to be a developer on this system other than being at
least a college student. Additionally, minimal certification should be required to
develop on the platform. It will be a loose requirement (or more of a strong sugges-
tion) that students have taken and passed the introductory systems programming
course, so that they have an existing knowledge of programming for Linux or a
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Requirement Group # Name Details
For Developers
3.1.1 Credentials Any college-level developer
3.1.2 Licensing/Certification Intro. to Systems Programming
Table 3.3: Non-Functional Personnel Requirements
similar operating system. The class CPE357, “Systems Programming”, is taken
by all computer engineering, computer science, and software engineering students
early in their Cal Poly career, and should be sufficient experience to develop for
the new software architecture. Thanks to courses like these, the learning curve
for satellite software development is significantly reduced because most students
will join the organization with some related experience.
3.3 New Design Philosophies
In addition to the requirements that bound the design, a number of design philoso-
phies were utilized that were not emphasized in the previous design. First and
foremost, a strong emphasis is placed on software modularity for this design to
isolate components and support extensibility. It also supports the next design
principle of encouraging parallel development, which can greatly reduce devel-
opment time. Furthermore, now that the Linux operating system is being used,
there is far more pre-existing code that could potentially be useful for the project
and we hope to leverage as much of it as possible.
3.3.1 Software Modularity
As defined by the Linux Dictionary, software modularity is: “A programming
style that breaks down program functions into modules, each of which accom-
plishes one function and contains all the source code and variables needed to
accomplish that function” [12]. This style of programming significantly simplifies
the maintenance and debugging of the system because individual modules can
be isolated for revision or testing without affecting the entire system. In a large,
modular software system finding the source of problems can be easier as well
because the problematic function should be able to be isolated into a minimal
number of modules. A consistent usage of this this philosophy will enable the
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new PolySat system to be easy to revise and thus encourage its continued use in
future projects.
The emphasis on software modularity is also to encourage the reduction of
hardware modularity in CubeSat projects. Hardware modularity is a common
design philosophy in CubeSats, likely because it gives the appearance of a clean
design from the perspective of the systems and electrical engineers. However,
since CubeSats are highly volume constrained platforms, hardware modularity
can be very expensive due to the typical volume requirements. Emphasizing
software modularity can help reduce the volume requirement of the avionics sys-
tem by implementing some of the modules that are traditionally implemented in
hardware, in software.
Favoring software modularity over hardware modularity also reduces the com-
plexity of the system because the number of custom interfaces is reduced. Typ-
ically, in order to interface with different hardware modules, custom software
interfaces must be written. Furthermore, these custom interfaces are code that
is rarely reusable and exist for no other purpose than to support the hardware
modularity. In some cases, these modules may only be used for some missions and
thus a significant amount of effort may be invested in code that neither directly
relates to the mission nor will be used in future missions.
PolySat experienced this first hand with the previous design, where the con-
cept of hardware modularity was used to separate the communications and C&DH
components. The correct operation of this interface was critical to the system
because it was the path to and from the transceiver. A custom driver was re-
quired for this interface and was even upgraded in later revisions of the system
to include additional robustness (see Section 2.1.4). Unfortunately, this interface
was very specific to the microcontrollers that were being used and thus the code
could not be reused if similar interfaces were desired with different processors.
Furthermore, this interface was hypothesized to be the root of the cause for both
the failures of CP4 and CP6, where the C&DH could no longer communicate
with the ground (further explained in Section 2.2). These events are a driving
force to this design philosophy: by favoring software modularity we can limit the
number of custom hardware interfaces, maximize code reusability between unique
missions, and potentially increase reliability.
24
3.3 New Design Philosophies
3.3.2 Encouragement of Parallel Development
PolySat’s team of software developers has grown significantly since the first gen-
eration system was developed; while it once was comprised of two or three core
members, there may now be more than five people working on a single project.
Most of the software development on the prior system was needed to be completed
at a bench in the lab to be able to load the software onto the microcontroller for
testing. As a result the number of simultaneous developers was limited by access
to the lab benches. However, with the selection of Linux as the new operating
system, these ties to the bench have been severed because a significant amount of
code can be compiled and executed in any Linux environment. Therefore, a very
important design philosophy for this new software architecture is that parallel
development should be both enabled and actively encouraged.
This concept directly supports the development time requirement, 2.1, which
states the system should enable a short turn around for new missions. When more
students that can work on the project at the same time, the software should be
produced at a faster rate.
3.3.3 Pre-Existing Code
The total user base of Unix-like operating systems is considerable and as a result,
a large amount of code has been written for it and is available for free, under an
open source license. Linux supports a significant amount of this code thanks to its
support of various open standards, such as POSIX. Utilizing these packages will
not only reduce development time by reducing the amount of code that needs to
be written, but also potentially improve reliability since the packages are in use in
other projects. OpenSSL is an excellent example of this, which was first released
in 1998, but is still actively being developed for and used in a wide variety of
applications [13].
It also is worth acknowledging that the operating system and standard C li-
braries provide a non-trivial amount of pre-existing code. This is a significant
source of added reliability due to the prevalent use of the Linux operating system
and also greatly reduces development time. Throughout the new design, there are
examples of leveraging Linux-provided interfaces, from the fundamental file ab-
straction system calls up to the inter-process communication mechanisms heavily
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leveraging the provided socket APIs.
Pre-existing code from other sources is also used when possible to aid the
development process. This decision has been paramount to being able to develop
a prototype of the software platform in a reasonable amount of time, in addition
to inspiring confidence in our customers by being able to specify that this code
is used in other, pre-existing platforms. The OpenSSL library, as mentioned
previously, provides all of the core functionality for the cryptography component
of the new architecture (Section 5.1). Source code was also taken directly from
other open source projects, such as the priority queue heap implementation in
the event handler (Section 4.3.1). These particular examples have been vital to
the success of the design because they provide features that would have been very
difficult and time-consuming to develop from scratch.
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The new software system’s architecture looks far different than that of the previ-
ous generation’s because of the emphasis on software modularity and the options
afforded to us by the utilization of Linux. The system is now comprised of two
primary layers: processes and libraries. The processes are responsible for the
actual functionality of the satellite, and the libraries provide middleware-type
services to the processes. This type of architecture improves upon the previous
because it allows features and functionality to be added and upgraded without
having to recompile or rewrite other modules.
4.1 Software Overview
The software architecture has been fundamentally re-designed as a result of the
choice to utilize a new operating system. Linux provides a simple mechanism for
address space isolation and protection, the process. This is important because it
provides a natural level of granularity for modules. Further, processes simplify
parallel development since each process can be developed as a black box and
without understanding the entire system, as was needed with the first generation
software architecture. Thus, processes have been utilized to implement all of the
basic functions of the system and provide one of the major levels of software
modularity in the system.
The system processes have been defined as shown in Figure 4.1. Each of these
processes are defined in Section 4.2. These processes utilize many common mech-
anisms and functions, which have been designed into a set of shared libraries that
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are discussed in Section 4.3. The last defining characteristic of this architecture
is that there are two different modes of operation, the selection of which is based
on whether or not the NAND Flash is functioning properly.
Kernel
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ADCS Payload
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Figure 4.1: Software Architecture - This figure shows all of the software modules,
separated by minimum mode of operation where they are available. The satellite is always
at least in degraded mode, which occurs when the satellite first boots. Full functionality
mode is entered after the NAND flash has been verified as functional.
Some of the other new features were not enabled by just Linux itself, but
also the open source packages that are available for it. Specifically, a SQLite
database is used for storing telemetry and the OpenSSL library is utilized for its
various security and fault tolerant features. These packages meet both the design
philosophy of leveraging pre-existing code and numerous requirements regarding
capabilities, correctness, and security.
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4.1.1 Operation Modes
Two basic modes of operation that dictate the capabilities of the system have been
chosen based on the effects that radiation have on the different memories. The
phase change memory (PCM) has been shown to be tolerant up to 30 MRad [10],
which is orders of magnitude greater than that of the NAND Flash. To maximize
the utility of this phase change memory part, the minimum amount of function-
ality required to communicate with the satellite and execute basic commands
will be stored on the PCM part to avoid corruption from radiation and enable a
degraded mode of operation. The satellite will enter this mode by default until
the the integrity of each file on the NAND flash has been confirmed.
Degraded mode provides the basic processes: beacon, system manager, com-
munications, and the software watchdog. These processes are sufficient to allow
the ground station operator to interact with and diagnose the spacecraft. The
drivers available are limited to those related to the vital subsystems, such as the
transceiver and processor related sensors. Lastly, since the state of the NAND
flash is unknown in this mode, access to it is not enabled. Work is being done
to enable the upload of full kernel and filesystem images so that the spacecraft
could potentially recover if the spacecraft is stuck in state.
Full functionality mode is entered after the NAND flash has been verified
and enables all of the features of the spacecraft, which includes the data logger
process and when necessary, mission specific processes. In this mode of operation,
the data logger (Section 4.2.4) is autonomously collecting and storing telemetry.
To support this, additional library functionality is also provided in this mode
(discussed in Section 4.3), as well as the drivers for the rest of the components
on the satellite. The satellite is expected to spend a majority of its time in this
mode.
4.1.2 Inter-Process Communications
It is important that processes can communicate with one another in a straight-
forward manner. This is another opportunity to leverage significant pre-existing
code because the Linux kernel provides a number of different options for inter-
process communication, such as TCP/IP, UDP/IP, and Unix Domain Sockets.
The latter is intended only for inter-process communications, while the two for-
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mer also enable networked communications.
The first instinct was to use the simplest, lowest overhead option, Unix Do-
main Sockets. Unfortunately, upon further investigation of this option, it was
realized that an additional packet format would need to be designed on top of
these messages in order to support this. Some of the notable desired features
included checksums and numeric identification of processes. The first design had
a custom module for receiving packets from the transceiver and converting them
into the alternate packet format and there was also a significant amount of custom
code required for both sending and receiving these types of messages.
Quickly, we arrived at the realization that we were redesigning the IP stack
and since the intention was to configure the Unix Domain Sockets as datagram
packets, the existing UDP/IP stack could be utilized and require far less custom
code to support our desired features. Specifically, UDP uses ports for destination
addresses and there are checksums in both the IP and UDP layers that are handled
by the kernel. Furthermore, by using an IP based protocol, it will be simple in
the future to support standard IP-based applications such as Telnet and Secure
Shell (SSH). Using applications like these can be immensely helpful for debugging
the system because it would enable command line access from the ground.
Utilizing UDP enables a number of things that simplify the design of the
system. Standard Linux systems utilize the file /etc/services to match service
names to ports, and vice versa; an API is provided to accomplish this, within the
standard libraries. The PolySat system has a number of pre-defined services, in
the form of the processes, and thus fits well with this system. All of the processes
will be added to the file with a port number, so that in order to communicate
with a particular process, the only requirement is to know the destination process’
name.
4.2 Processes
The processes are responsible for the core actions of the satellite. They have
been selected such that each primary function is implemented in its own process.
Processes have the distinct advantage over threads by providing a separate process
address space for each and thus protecting the modules from each other’s memory
corruption. There are two different types of processes: static and temporary. The
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primary difference, other than the duration, is that static processes are based
around the custom PolySat libraries (Section 4.3) and are written in C; whereas
the temporary processes can be developed in any Linux-supported language (see
Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.7).
There are a couple of shared high-level commands for each static process, in
order to facilitate different aspects of the satellite and also increase the amount of
reused code. Rather than have each process implement its own system informa-
tion status command, one is implemented in the standard library that provides
all of the memory and CPU usage information, since the acquisition of this in-
formation is the same regardless of the specific process. The second command is
the generic status command, which provides any soft state related to the specific
process. Soft state information includes any values related to the operations of
the process, such as a count of an action specific to that process. This command
is utilized in a variety of ways, but generally it ensures that the useful state values
of a process can be queried from both the ground and other processes to facilitate
debugging and telemetry gathering.
4.2.1 Beacon
The Beacon module is implemented as a static process and is responsible for
one distinct function: periodically initiating the broadcasting of key satellite
telemetry.
This is very important to all spacecraft because it provides a mechanism for
tracking and identifying the CubeSat when it is ejected from the P-POD. When
the satellites are first tracked in orbit, the ones that came out from the same
P-POD or even sometimes the same launch vehicle can be very close together.
When this happens, it’s difficult to identify exactly where each spacecraft is and
thus a lot of time is spent aiming antennas at the different objects in order
to determine the spacecraft’s location. In order to locate a satellite without
a beacon, commands must be sent to the satellite in hopes that a response is
issued. However, CubeSats are not known for their receive sensitivity (see Cal
Poly’s history in Section 2.2), so this method is very difficult since a response
may not be elicited even if the antennas are aimed at the correct spacecraft.
The solution to this is to have the satellite configured to be transmitting
periodically so that the ground stations only have to track each object as long
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as the period of this transmission. This resulting periodic transmission is the
beacon.
The beacon is also useful for information gathering via amateur radio stations
around the world. The CP6 satellite was a very successful demonstration of this
capability: a limited packet decoder was distributed to amateur radio operators
around the world, which enabled them to downlink packets and then submit them
to a database. This information primarily consisted of beacon packets and totaled
to a larger amount of data than was collected at Cal Poly’s own earth station!
Based on the success of this strategy, PolySat hopes to provide similar software
packages for each satellite and also ensure that the beacon has a large amount
of useful information in order to take advantage of this global data collection
method.
The beacon is one of the simplest processes in the system and only has one
unique command, Change Rate, which has one argument: the new desired rate
for the beacon.
The specific format of the beacon is rigid per mission, due to the ground
station requiring a precisely known packet format for every downlinked packet.
This unfortunately typically changes for each mission because there is frequently
payload-specific data in the beacon. However, in degraded mode of operation,
there are no payload processes, so the standard beacon is constructed by querying
the other active processes status and putting the responses into a packet.
4.2.2 Communication
The communication module is essentially a software modularity answer to what
was previously implemented through hardware modularity (see First Generation
Design, Section 2.1.2) with a PIC microcontroller. At a high level, the software
module is responsible for the same thing as the microcontroller was: encoding and
decoding packets that are going to or coming from the transceiver, respectively.
It also manages the control and configuration of the transceiver hardware, so it
is responsible for both the data link (L2) and physical (L1) layers of satellite
communications.
Unfortunately, both layer schemes are dictated (and limited) by the PolySat
ground station support because significant dependencies exist in both the hard-
ware and software infrastructure for communicating with the satellite while it is
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in orbit. All previous missions have utilized the AX.25 packet format [5], and that
is what will be initially implemented for this system, as well, to be compatible
with the existing ground station. The primary issue with this is that the AX.25
protocol has a relatively high overhead (14 bytes per 256 byte packet), so the
implementation needs to be flexible enough to allow for potential upgrades in the
future with a more minimal protocol.
The communication process is responsible for all of the low level network
management, from configuring the transmission parameters in the transceiver up
to medium access control. Before any communication can occur, the transceiver
must be configured to input and output the anticipated type of radio frequency
signal. Once the transceiver is initialized, packets can be received or transmitted
by the radio. Also, since our current hardware design only enables half-duplex
communication, meaning you can only transmit or receive at any given time, the
communication process may need to do medium access control to avoid collisions.
The best example of this would be when the transceiver begins receiving a packet,
the communication process will not send any packets for transmission until the
packet has been completely received, or after a timeout that would indicate a
partial packet has been received.
The next challenge for the communications process is the routing of packets
to and from other processes within the satellite. This is another situation where
reliability is increased and development time was decreased, by leveraging the
pre-existing network stack within the Linux kernel. The tun/tap interface has
been used to inject raw IP packets into the kernel after they have been received,
and to acquire packets that have been sent from other processes that are intended
to be transmitted. This solution has greatly simplified the communication process
design.
4.2.3 System Manager
The system manager process is primarily responsible for maintaining the state of
the avionics system, both hard and soft state. This includes all of the different
kernel statistics that are available through the /proc/stat/ interface, basic hard-
ware state information (temperature and power consumption of the processor),
and side panel sensor data. Additionally, the system manager enables a variety
of administration actions through simple commands, such as Kill Process and
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Reboot System.
These capabilities are grouped together to provide a focal point of access for
all of the state information of the satellite. If the database were the single point
of access for this information, it would be impossible to acquire in the degraded
mode from the ground. This is not acceptable because it is very important that
this state information and the system administration capabilities are available in
all modes of operation because it is vital to diagnosing and potentially solving
problems.
4.2.4 Data Logger
There are a number of events in the spacecraft that occur at a regular frequency
throughout the entirety of the mission, such as telemetry storage. Also, it is
common that payloads would like to run one-off experiments that return some
type of data, upon completion, which needs to be stored in non-volatile memory.
The shared characteristics of these events are utilized in the data logger process,
which spawns temporary processes that collect and output the resulting data.
This data is then captured by the data logger and stored into the database.
Unfortunately, as a result of this dependency to the database, the data logger
cannot run in degraded mode.
The chosen output format from spawned processes is key value pairs, printed
to standard out, because it enables the temporary processes (see Section 4.2.7)
to be developed in whatever language is convenient. The key value pairs will be
parsed by the data logger, the key looked up in the database, and then the value
stored with that key. The database does not have to have any key-specific code
as long as the string is unique, which it should be.
Another capability of the data logger includes being able to schedule experi-
ments for some time (an offset or UTC time) in the future and repeat experiments.
An experiment will exist in the form of a temporary process that is executed at
the scheduled time, which could be a binary, or merely a script. This type of
scheduling request is very common for state-less payloads, such as CP7 [9], and
thus eliminates the requirement of a process devoted to this common type of
payload.
There are also some limitations to the data logger, particularly related to the
rate of spawning processes. The selected temporary events should not exceed a
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rate such that it costs more power and CPU time to fork off the process than it
would to just add a static process. Processes that require high rates of telemetry
collection or running may fall under the category of mission specific, which are
described in Section 4.2.6.
The data logger is being developed as a senior project and a detailed design
document should be published as a result, approximately at the same time as
this thesis.
4.2.5 Watchdog
The software watchdog process is one of the cornerstones of the software fault
tolerance of the system and is described in detail in Section 5.2. It watches all
of the processes in the system and attempts to validate that they are operating
as intended, periodically. In order to accomplish this, a query is regularly issued
to all of the processes for their status and then the response (or lack thereof) is
analyzed to verify that the process is operating correctly. The software watchdog
is also responsible for tapping both the internal and external watchdogs. The last
responsibility of this process is to validate configuration changes of other processes
during run-time, to prevent the inquiring process from using a corrupted value.
4.2.6 Mission Specific Static Processes
The other potential static processes are those specifically related to the mission,
most likely in the form of ADCS or payload control. ADCS is good candidate
for a static process because often relatively high frequency sensor readings are
required. For example, CP6 demonstrated an implementation of the ADCS algo-
rithm, B-dot, which needs sensor updates at approximately 10 Hz. The overhead
of spawning a process 10 times a second with data logger would exceed that of
just using a static process, and thus it is a good candidate. Payloads that require
this type of control would also be eligible for a static process.
4.2.7 Temporary Processes
Most missions will likely fly a number of temporary processes because of the
simple interface to the database through the data logger. Also, thanks to the
wide variety of languages that have Linux support, these temporary processes
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can be written in whatever language the developer is most comfortable in and
supports the timeline. Using scripting languages like Python can significantly
improve development time for new devices and payloads.
Some temporary processes have already been designed into the system, as
shown in the software architecture diagram (Figure 4.1). The data export pro-
cess is currently being written so that a compressed version of the database can
be downlinked and maintained on the ground. The read state process will be
used to collect the state information from the individual processes, for storage
in the database. Other temporary processes are likely to be developed, such as
the sensor readings or “one-off” experiments, which will likely be written on a
hardware and mission-specific basis.
4.3 Abstraction Libraries
A standard set of libraries have been designed and implemented to provide a
standard set of features for the static processes described in Section 4.2. These
libraries facilitate the development of the processes and also encourage code reuse
with features like time and file event handling, configuration files, and inter-
process communication command handling. The library is compiled as a shared-
object to simplify version management; once the library is installed, the same
version will be used by every process running on that system.
One of the considerable non-functional advantages of using these libraries is
that developers can also compile them for their personal machines, if they are
running a Unix-type operating system (including popular choices such as, but
not limited to OS X and Ubuntu). This is very much in line with the parallel
development philosophy because process developers are not limited to using the
custom hardware, but can now develop on personal computers.
Similar to the modes of operation, the libraries are separated into two distinct
categories: base and full functionality. The base library contains all of the com-
ponents necessary for running the degraded mode processes and has a minimal
footprint, whereas the full functionality library adds additional features that are
too large in size to fit on the phase change memory or require access to the NAND
flash, such as the database, which is stored there.
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4.3.1 Event Handler
The satellite is an event-driven system by nature and thus an event handler was
designed to be at the core of every process. In the satellite, there are generally
two types of events that occur: timed and command-initiated. Since this system
utilizes UDP for all inter-process communication, the only way a command can
be received is via the process’s socket. This fact can be exploited to develop
an event handler based around the Linux system call, select, which is easily
configured to watch file descriptors for data available, as well as wait for a certain
amount of time, for timed events.
The general design for the event handler will cause the process to block until
either a timed event is ready to execute, or a file descriptor event is ready (typ-
ically a read or write). The process can add any type of timed or file-descriptor
based event with a corresponding callback function, so the event handler can be
customized to the process’s needs. It is important that within these callback
functions no blocking function calls are used because that would significantly
delay the amount of time until the process returned to the event loop and thus
potentially delay registered timed events. A simple state diagram for this system
is shown in Figure 4.2.
Process Blocks
File descriptor 
callback 
executed
Timed event 
callback 
executed
FILE DESCRIPTOR EVENT
CALLBACK COMPLETES
CALLBACK COMPLETES
TIMED EVENT READY
Figure 4.2: Event Handler State Machine - The figure shows the basic states of the
event handler.
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4.3.2 Command Handler
All of the commands for a process will be received on its well-known UDP port
and a function is typically assigned to each different command (a process de-
signer could choose to have two commands map to the same function). Rather
than requiring each process to (re)implement a command handler to parse each
command, a standard one has been designed utilizing the first byte of the incom-
ing message to determine the function to call.
Since the first byte of the incoming message has been designated the com-
mand byte, it can be used as an index into an array of function pointers. This
array of function pointers is constructed in the process initialization sequence
(see Section 4.3.7) based on a simple command configuration file that matches
the function name to the command value. Each function pointer in the array is
initialized to point to a function that will reply with a negative acknowledgment
(NACK), in order to handle incorrect commands. Issuing a NACK enables the
ground station operator to know that the packet was received by the satellite and
be alerted an invalid command was issued.
The command handler also utilizes the cryptography aspect of the library
(briefly described in Section 4.3.6 and in detail, Section 5.1) in order to validate
protected commands before allowing the process to handle it. If a command is
protected, that means it is required to be signed and the source of the command
must have the appropriate permissions to execute it. If the command fails to
pass these checks, the corresponding function is not called. The basic procedure
of receiving a command is shown in a flow diagram in Figure 4.3.
4.3.3 Inter-Process Communication Abstraction
The inter-process communication (IPC) component of the library provides a sim-
plified abstraction of the existing Linux API for creating and using non-blocking
UDP sockets. These abstractions are directly utilized by the command handler
and other aspects of the library to receive and send commands, but can be used in
any process to communicate on any UDP port. This enables processes to utilize
additional channels of communication, if necessary, without having to implement
the low level socket interactions.
The IPC component also provides process name lookup abstractions, so that
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Figure 4.3: Command Handler Flow Diagram - Software flow diagram for the com-
mand handler.
the port of another process can be looked up in the /etc/services file. A
function for the reverse is also provided: a name can be used to acquire a socket
address structure with the port. The socket address structure can then be used
to send messages to the process with that name.
4.3.4 Configuration Management
Another feature enabled by the library is utilization of configuration files. This
allows the process to have various pre-configured states, as well as simplify testing
on the target platform by enabling the configuration without having to recompile
and transfer the new process binary to the board.
The actual implementation for this system enables a variety of variable types,
such as integers, strings, and internet protocol addresses. These variables can also
be placed in objects, with syntax akin to XML, which produce a single structure
(a struct, in C) in the code. In the source code that is using a configuration file,
the expected variables are pre-defined, so that they can appear in any order and
in arrays within the configuration file itself. An example command configuration
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# Sample Beacon Command Conf i gura t ion F i l e
<CMD>
PROC=BEACON
NAME=STATUS
FUNC=beacon s ta tus
NUM=1
CMDOID=10
GRPOID=30
PROTECTION=0
</CMD>
Figure 4.4: Example Configuration File - An example configuration file; this one
shows a portion of the command configuration file for the Beacon process.
file for the Beacon process is shown in Figure 4.4.
4.3.5 Standard Debug/Error Interface
One of the more important standard practices for software development is a
unified debugging and error logging interface. Linux already provides an error
output stream, stderr, which can be utilized for debugging during development
when the target board is connected to a terminal output. However, output to
the terminal is not very useful while the satellite is in space and thus some type
of logging capability is necessary.
Fortunately, once again Linux already has this capability built-in with the
system logger, syslog. Thus, the debug and error logging interface provided for
processes will print to both stderr and the syslog so that debugging can be
done on the ground and in space. Using both is important so that the code that
will be utilized in space is also ran on the ground for testing purposes. It is easy
to make the mistake of ignoring a space-only feature and it is hoped to increase
the testing of flight functionality throughout testing.
Other Linux features were leveraged for this debug interface, as well. Linux
system calls and a number of standard library functions utilize a standard error
reporting global variable, errno. When an error occurs in one of these functions,
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it gets set to a number that corresponds to a type of error, which also has an
associated error message. As part of this debug interface, these error messages
are printed and logged via the use of a simple macro that wraps the function call.
4.3.6 Cryptography
The cryptography portion of this library provides a simplified interface to partic-
ular aspects of the OpenSSL library. There are a few primary functions provided
from this portion of the API: data hashing, message signing, and message vali-
dation. The hashing provides a secure hashing capability for use wherever data
integrity or security is necessary. This is also used by message validation and
signing, which is used for ensuring critical commands are received by the satel-
lite uncorrupted. The justification and implementation details are provided in
Section 5.1.
4.3.7 PolySat Library Base
All of the above components are wrapped into single basic library component
and their capabilities are available in all modes of operation. A few higher-level
functions, which utilize a number of components, are provided to further simplify
the usage of the library features.
When each process starts it will call an initialization function, which obtains
and initializes all of the important aspects of the process. A flow diagram of this
is shown in Figure 4.5. This includes creating the event handler object, opening
a socket bound to the process’s port number, and registering with the watchdog.
It also creates a file based on the processes name with the .pid extension that
contains its process ID, and another file in a separate location based on the process
id with the .proc extension that contains the process name. These files are used
by the software watchdog (see Section 5.2.4). This initialization will insure that
all absolutely necessary actions that are common among all static processes are
completed. A process cleanup function is also provided, which frees the memory
allocated and removes the files created during the initialization sequence.
In addition to the initialization and cleanup functions, a non-blocking IPC
function is provided. This is not implemented within the IPC component of the
library because it requires utilization of the event handler. The event handler is
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Figure 4.5: Process Initialize Flow Diagram - Software flow diagram for the process
initialization sequence.
used to schedule the write operation when it will not block. This is very important
to insure the correct operations of the process because any blocking operations
could significantly delay the process’ return to the select call within the event
handler and result in missed deadlines.
These high level command interfaces provide the process with a choice to
send a message to another process one of two ways: by name or address. When
a message is sent by name, the IPC lookup function is used to acquire the socket
address. In order to avoid having to do this lookup every time, the option is
also provided to use the standard socket address structure. This structure can
be acquired by completing the lookup at the beginning of the process, to avoid
requiring it each time. This may be used if a process intends to communicate reg-
ularly with another process to reduce message latencies (demonstrated in Results,
Section 4.4).
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4.3.8 Database
One of the initial challenges of the new system design was determining how to
store all of the telemetry and experiment data. In the previous system, there
were very few options due to limited storage and code space. However, with the
relatively large amount of storage available in the new system, the number of
options grew significantly. The first instinct was to utilize a database of some
kind because it is a typical option for data storage in most computing systems
and there is also a course at Cal Poly that teaches database systems. The choice
was made fairly easy when looking at the different Linux compatible solutions and
it was found that the open source package SQLite was very prevalent in similar
embedded situations, such as a variety of modern mobile devices [14]. Selecting
this package is in line with our intentions of leveraging pre-existing code and
minimizing custom code because SQLite provides a simple C API that requires
just a wrapper to be developed to enable the use of a database within our system.
In order to allow a large amount of telemetry in the database, the raw database
is to be stored on the NAND flash non-volatile memory. However, as a result of
this decision, the database API can only be used in full operations mode since
there is no read/write access to the NAND flash part of the file system in degraded
functionality.
4.4 Results
In order to assess the ability of the system to meet some of the non-functional sys-
tem requirements (see Table 3.1), such as time performance (1.2.1) and footprint
(1.2.2), some of the completed components of the system have been characterized.
All tests have been run on the target platform hardware and timing tests have
utilized the internal time keeping functionality of the Linux kernel.
4.4.1 Memory Footprints
The memory footprints of the components are important for two reasons: there
is minimal non-volatile storage available for degraded mode of the spacecraft and
reducing the volatile memory footprint reduces the power consumption. The
storage requirements of the have been summarized in Table 4.1 and the volatile
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memory requirements in Table 4.2.
Aspect Component Stored Size
Libraries
PolySat Base 69 KB
OpenSSL 1.56 MB
SQLite 451.1 KB
Processes
Beacon 11.5 KB
Watchdog 18.2 KB
Table 4.1: Various Component’s Non-Volatile Storage Requirements - These are
the size of some of the static processes and library binaries when compiled for the processor.
The base custom library (Section 4.3) itself has been shown to have a very
small footprint of only 69KB, while the processes themselves are even smaller,
with the beacon (Section 4.2.1) at 11.5KB and a more complex process, the soft-
ware watchdog (Section 4.2.5) requires 18.2KB. These file sizes are when compiled
without debugging symbols, since they are unnecessary in flight software. The
largest components of the system are by far the other open source libraries that
are utilized, with OpenSSL weighing in at 1.56MB and SQLite at 451.1KB.
Both processes measure required just over two megabytes of RAM while run-
ning, however, it is important to note that most of the memory is used the
libraries, which accounts for 1840 KB or nearly 80% of the memory needed for
each process. This information was collected by using the /proc/<pid>/status
interface while the process was running.
Process Run-Time Memory
Beacon 2312 KB
Watchdog 2416 KB
Table 4.2: Static Process Runtime Memory Requirements - This table shows the
total virtual memory allocated for these processes. This includes the memory required for
utilizing both the custom and standard libraries, which accounts for 1840 KB.
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Event Average Time
Static Process Initialization (Default) 15.2 ms
Static Process Initialization (Improved) 9.1 ms
UDP Message (Process Name – Default) 16.2 ms
UDP Message (Process Name – Improved) 10.0 ms
UDP Message (Socket Address) 7.2 ms
Table 4.3: Latency of Common Library Events - The default latencies were achieved
by adding the process port numbers to the end of /etc/service file, whereas the improved
time is a result of relocating them to the beginning of the file.
4.4.2 Common Library Event Latencies
Some of the different key actions in the system have been timed and are shown
in Table 4.3. The presented results are an average of numerous attempts, with
a single process running in the system. Although the actual system will have
multiple processes executing in the system, at any given time, it is more likely
for them to be blocking than actively running due to the periodic nature of their
actions and the relatively long time between events (e.g. a typical beacon rate is
no faster than 30 seconds), meaning events are unlikely to be compute bound.
The process initialization step gives an idea of how long it takes the custom
library to generate all of the standard objects that each static process uses (see
Section 4.3 for more information on this sequence). Since the last step of initial-
ization is to tap the watchdog, it is important this time is minimized. Based on
the measurements taken, this sequence takes approximately 15.2 ms on average.
At worst, this means it would take a five static processes approximately 76 ms
to all boot up. This is an acceptable latency because it is far less than 16 second
internal watchdog timeout, meaning the software watchdog can safely wait for all
processes to boot up and register with it before sending a heartbeat signal.
The next measurements are the end-to-end latency of sending a message from
one process to another, a number of components are used from the library for this
to occur: the IPC abstraction sends the message, the event handler recognizes
there is data available on the socket, and then the command handler reads the
data and finally calls the corresponding function. The simplest interface is the one
where the destination process name is provided, however, a significant amount of
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Event Period Average Absolute Error % Absolute Error
Beacon 5s 4.98ms .10%
Watchdog Status Query 10s 1.87ms .02%
Table 4.4: Scheduler Accuracy Measurements - These results show the measured
error of the event handler’s scheduler with two processes actively running in the system.
time can be attributed to the lookup of the port name in the /etc/services file.
This is demonstrated by the results with the socket address, which only take 7.2
ms on average.
The IPC named port lookup function (Section 4.3.3) is used in the initializa-
tion sequence to lookup the port for the process, so a slight tweak has been applied
to the /etc/services file to improve performance. The lookup performed in the
file is evidently approximately linear because when placing the process name at
the beginning of the list, both the messaging and initialization times improve
significantly. The average latencies have been reduced by at least 5 ms; improved
messaging is now 10 ms and the improved initialization time has been reduced to
almost 9 ms.
4.4.3 Scheduler Accuracy
The accuracy of the event scheduler (Section 4.3.1) has also been analyzed to
provide an idea of how accurate the deadlines it can provide are, these results
are summarized in the Table 4.4. The configuration was chosen to simulate a
potential satellite operations environment. A the beacon and watchdog process
was running, with a 5 second periodic “beacon” event and the watchdog collecting
statuses every 10 seconds. The accuracy of all of these three timed events has
been collected by analyzing data over a runtime of approximately 450 seconds,
with minimal other activity in the system.
These events are the primary scheduled events in degraded mode of the space-
craft, but are running at a rate far higher than would be typical in flight. In spite
of this, the beacon is still being executed at less than a tenth of a percentage of
deviation from the desired rate; whereas the watchdog query event is even more
accurate, with closer to one hundredth of a percentage of deviation. Even with
both processes running simultaneously and actively completing their tasks, there
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is minimal strain on computing resources, which allows the events to run very
closely to the desired rate. This is similar to the system’s operation in degraded
mode where few other periodic events are occurring.
It is worth noting that as more activities occur within the system, the average
error is likely going to increase due to the additional strain on the computing
resources. If fairly high frequencies are necessary, it is likely worth considering
a kernel module with direct interrupt service routine access rather than using
a static process, to provide better timing guarantees. Regardless, these results
show that if required, the event handler can manage the majority of the scheduling
needs for static processes in the system with good accuracy.
4.5 Design Success
The success of the design can be assessed by looking at how well the software
architecture has met the design guidelines, functional requirements and philoso-
phies.
An extremely flexible command system has been enabled by providing each
individual process with its own command space via the command handler. The
command handler also helps with radiation awareness by validating signed com-
mands transparently, along with the software watchdog which monitors the pro-
cesses for correct operation to insure no radiation events have affected function-
ality. The last of the guidelines, telemetry, has also been addressed in a number
of modules: every process has both system and operational state information,
the system manager enables access to vital telemetry in degraded mode, and the
data logger provides a simple interface for storing telemetry of any kind.
The functional requirements for the system have also been sufficiently satis-
fied. The data logger process has been designed to specifically support the first
requirement of telemetry collection and storage, by spawning processes to collect
telemetry and then storing the resulting data into the database that is saved on
the NAND flash non-volatile memory. The next requirement, a beacon, also has
a dedicated process and in order to transmit this data, in addition to meeting
the following requirement, the communication process has been designed to sup-
port transmitting and receiving AX.25 packets. As for the requirement dictating
the specific commands, those have also been implemented; downlinking teleme-
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try is available in a variety of methods, such as through the querying individual
processes for function specific information or the system manager for satellite
state. The final functional requirement has been built into the core functional-
ity of the custom libraries with the event handler that can schedule a variety of
events, which in turn enabled the data logger to easily schedule the execution of
commands after their reception.
The design philosophies are also prevalent throughout the system. Software
modularity is fundamental to the concept of the architecture, as all major com-
ponents are isolated into processes that can be developed as a black box with
clearly defined interfaces (commands for static processes and data logger inter-
face for temporary ones). This also lends to the next philosophy of simultane-
ous development, which has been further supported by the custom libraries that
enable development on operating systems other than embedded Linux, which
PolySat team members are more likely to run on their own computers. The last
philosophy of utilizing pre-existing code is evident throughout this design by the
usage of a variety of open source and other sources of existing code. It especially
common in the custom library that provides abstractions of the standard library,
OpenSSL, and SQLite APIs.
By successfully following the outlined design approach, the PolySat team
should be able to rely on this software architecture for any mission in the fore-
seeable future.
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Many mechanisms for providing fault tolerance to the spacecraft were researched
and considered (see Chapter 7), but the result is that the majority of these add sig-
nificant complexity and require far more man-hours than an educational project
like PolySat can provide. A number of fault tolerance techniques have been
implemented in the core of the system architecture, such as error logging (Sec-
tion 4.3.5) and error detection checks with checksums on IPCs (Section 4.1.2).
However, this chapter focuses on two components implemented specifically for
their fault tolerance: digitally signed commands and the software watchdog pro-
cess. Through these two aspects of the software system, it is believed that the
majority of radiation events (SEUs and SELs) can be detected, logged, and re-
acted upon appropriately.
5.1 Cryptography: Digitally Signed Commands
5.1.1 Goals
The goal of the cryptography component of the PolySat library (Section 4.3) is
to guarantee only valid commands are executed on the spacecraft. The definition
of valid in this case has two different aspects: correct and allowed. A command
is correct if no portion of the command was changed in transit from the ground
station to the main processor and it is allowed if the ground station operator has
been permitted to execute that command on the satellite.
Both of these goals are very important to the overall security of the satellite.
If a command that had a single bit flipped was forwarded to a process on the
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spacecraft, there is the risk of an unintended command being executed by that
process. In some cases, this may not be a cause for concern; for example, if
the beacon rate is adjusted by 15 seconds instead of 14 seconds (if the least
significant bit were flipped). However, there are some incidences where this could
be catastrophic if it were a mission-critical command, such as an attitude control
maneuver.
Executing only permitted commands is vital to the security of the spacecraft
for similar reasons, but a failure to provide this guarantee could enable rogue
ground station operators to execute critical mission commands. As the public
awareness of these CubeSat missions increases, there is greater potential for in-
terference from unaffiliated ground stations. Thus, it is important to be able to
provide a guarantee of security to ease the minds of those who have invested in
the mission and also to insure this mission is not unintentionally compromised
by executing an out-of-sequence command sent from a curious amateur radio
operator.
It is important to specify that there is no intention to obscure the commands
being sent to the spacecraft, but rather protect a certain set of commands that
are vital to the success of the mission.
5.1.2 Requirements
The requirements of the interface are fairly straightforward: a simple API must
be provided to digitally sign and validate messages sent from the ground station.
There are also requirements that bound the implementation of the digital sig-
natures to maximize the security. An asymmetric (public/private key) algorithm
should be used for generating the signatures and the private key utilized should
only be installed on trusted ground stations. This system relies on this concept
because if the key is distributed outside of its intended ground station, it would
enable other ground stations to send commands under the guise of the trusted
one and provide access to secured commands. This requirement provides the
guarantee that signed commands originated from a trusted off-satellite source.
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5.1.3 Implementation
The implementation of the cryptography relies heavily on the OpenSSL v1.0.0
library. It is worth noting this is another aspect of the satellite where reliability
is significantly increased through the reliance on pre-existing code. Furthermore,
this feature in particular would have been very difficult to implement an equiva-
lently robust solution without this library. The general process that this cryptog-
raphy component of the PolySat library supports is generating and subsequently
sending a command with a signature, which is then transmitted from a ground
station to the satellite, and then verified on the satellite for both correctness and
security. This flow is shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Signed Command Flow - High level flow diagram of a signed command.
Throughout the message signing and validating process, the data digest is a
key component; the digest is created by generating a hash of the data. The SHA-
256 hash algorithm has been chosen for generating the digest because the more
common SHA-1 has been shown to be a more likely source of collisions [15]. It is
important to note that while SHA-1 may be extremely secure, security is not the
only feature we are looking for in this cryptography module, we also want to be
able to guarantee any bit flips are detected. If two separate bit strings hashed to
the same value, a collision, then it is possible an unintended command could be
allowed to be executed in the system. Fortunately, the OpenSSL library provides
a SHA-256 hashing capability, which is used throughout the implementation.
An important aspect of the message signing are the certificates that hold the
public keys. For these keys, the X509v3 certificate type has been chosen because
it has an extensions capability that can be used for customized security beyond
just the keys and it is fully supported by the OpenSSL library APIs. This design
utilizes the extensions to allow for different levels of security, such that a single
ground station can be given permission to only be able to execute commands on
a specific satellite, or even as narrow as a particular command. These certificates
will be stored on the satellite so that when a command signature is verified, it
can be insured that the source of the message not only has a valid key, but also
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explicit permission to execute that command. The OpenSSL library is relied on
once again for this, which provides a simple API for reading the certificates and
iterating through the extensions.
The simplest function of the cryptography component of the library is the
digital signing, for which the steps to accomplish it are shown in Figure 5.2. It
heavily leverages the EVP component of the OpenSSL library, which is provided
as the high-level interface to cryptographic functions [16]. The general process
for signing a message is to create a digest of the data being sent, and then the
signature is generated using a particular encoding scheme from that digest. The
original data is then transmitted with the signature and the digest is discarded.
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Figure 5.2: Command Signature Generation Flow - Flow diagram for signing a
command.
The other primary function is the command validation, which also utilizes the
EVP interface and other components from the OpenSSL library. The steps to
validate a command are summarized in Figure 5.3. First, a digest is created of the
command. Next, a public key must be used to attempt to match the signature to
the digest. Since the command could have been sent from any ground station who
has been authorized to send commands to the satellite, multiple public keys may
need to be attempted until it validates. Once a public key is found that validates
the the command, the permissions need to be checked. If no matching public key
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is found that validates the signature, no response is given, in order to prevent
Denial of Service (DoS) [17] attacks on the spacecraft. This type of attack could
occur if an unauthorized ground station user continuously transmitted invalid
commands that resulted in a response, thus tying up the radio resource and
preventing trusted stations from uplinking to the satellite.
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Figure 5.3: Command Validation Generation Flow - Flow diagram for validat-
ing a command. A command is forwarded only after both the command’s validity and
permissions are verified; otherwise the command handler exits, dropping the command.
There are three primary levels of permissions: satellite, command and group.
Satellite permissions are checked first, to insure that the sender of the command
has permission to execute commands on the satellite that has been sent the
command. If that passes, it is checked to see if the ground station operator has
been given explicit permission to execute that command. If that fails, then the
last check is for group permissions. These type of permissions are customizable
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based on the mission, for example, “payload” group permissions could be given
to a customer’s ground station to enable the use of payload commands, but
not other system functionality. Other groups could be used following a similar
concept, limiting the scope of access to the spacecraft based on the needs and
involvement of the operators.
5.1.4 Results
The resulting digital signature is 128 bytes that needs to be appended to each
command that requires security. This may seem like a large amount, but given
a 9600 baud transmission rate with an encoding scheme that only requires one
symbol per bit to the spacecraft (as proposed for LightSail-1 and CP7), only an
extra tenth of a second is required to transmit the signature over the air.
The other primary downside of adding this feature is the potential additional
latency added to command response and execution. Timing tests have been com-
pleted to show approximately how much this overhead actually is, and results are
summarized in Table 5.1. These tests were set up and run on the AT91SAM9G20
microprocessor that is used in the target hardware platform. The tests were run
to look at the cost of requiring a different number of certificates to be checked
against the signature until one is found, or there are no more certificates to be
tested. If only a single certificate has been installed on the spacecraft, then it will
be the only one checked against signed commands. Therefore, the time will be
about the same for both a valid and invalid signature because the most expensive
operation is the signature verification. As a result, the number of certificates at-
tempted can be interpreted as either the signature was verified after that number
of certificates, or that was the total number on the spacecraft and no match was
found.
The results show that overall there is very minimal cost in both time and
transmit bandwidth, especially when there are a low number of certificates. With
a single certificate on the satellite, only an additional 6.5 ms of time is required
before a signed command can be executed. As more certificates are added, this
time increases, but not linearly because the overhead of the other processing is
being amortized, as indicated by the average time per certificate reducing. Also
shown are the maximum number of bits that could have been transmitted (in
response to the command) while this process is occurring. The goal is to show
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Certs Attempted Exec. Time Time Per Cert. Max Transmit Lost
1 6.5 ms 6.5 ms 62 bits
2 11.2 ms 5.6 ms 107 bits
3 15.7 ms 5.2 ms 150 bits
10 48.1 ms 4.8 ms 461 bits
Table 5.1: Digital Command Signature Verification Timing - Results from timing
the signature verification operation with a varying number of certificates attempted.
that if the amount of information that could have been sent over the air is fairly
minimal, even with a large number of certificates.
In spite of the delays necessary to support this capability, it is important to
note that this feature will not be used for a majority of commands, or even a large
number. It is specifically intended for those commands that are critical to the
success of the mission, such as attitude maneuvers or one-time only mechanisms,
like a mechanical deployment. Also, if coupled clever organization to reduce the
number of certificates attempted for the most common ground station operator
certificates, these costs can be minimized while still being required infrequently.
Furthermore, until other ground stations are outfitted to be able to communicate
with PolySat spacecraft, only a single certificate would be necessary for PolySat
operators. This means that for a missions where only the Cal Poly ground station
would be communicating with the spacecraft, this overhead is arguably negligible
since only a maximum of 62 bits would be lost.
5.2 Software Watchdog
5.2.1 Goals
The software watchdog is the first line of defense in the series of the watchdogs
contained within the new PolySat avionics system. The software watchdog’s
overall goal is to verify that all custom software components of the system are
operating correctly.
Its first goal is to detect and respond to single event effects (SEE) in the
digital components, which have affected the running software. These events are
a direct result of the satellite’s exposure to radiation while in orbit and can have
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catastrophic results to the system if not handled.
There are two types of radiation events that the watchdog should be par-
ticularly concerned with: single event upsets (SEU) and single event latch-ups
(SEL). SEUs are the more easily dealt with because they usually only result in
a bit flip [3], which is not a permanent fault because it can be solved with a
refresh of the affected memory. Stuck bits caused by SELs, on the other hand,
are far more dangerous because a latch-up can only be cleared by removing the
power [11]; there is also a risk of permanent damage to the IC, if not handled in
a timely manner.
The other goal for the watchdog is to validate operational parameter changes
after a reboot, so that any configuration change away from the default is verified
to be correct. Providing this additional validation method through the watchdog
provides a correctness guarantee for state changes and will prevent the satellite
from entering an unknown or incorrect state after a reboot.
The final goal is that the software watchdog is the single point of interaction
with both the internal and external watchdogs to limit the potential for unin-
tentional tapping. These hardware watchdogs are the final line of defense; when
the watchdog cannot do anything to recover the system, they should be able to
initiate a reset of the processor or the entire system.
A related question posed is, “Who watches the watchdog?”. Fortunately, the
answer is simple: the internal watchdog! If the software watchdog stops function-
ing properly, the internal watchdog should initiate a reboot of the processor and
result in a restart of the watchdog process. If the watchdog continues to fail to
start properly, then the hardware watchdog should cause a full system reset.
5.2.2 Requirements
The requirements for the software watchdog can be separated into the three
distinct responsibilities of the module: watching processes, tapping the hardware
watchdogs, and validating configuration changes.
The primary requirement of the process watching capability is that it must
be able to cover both static and temporary processes.
The temporary watching of a process will be utilized frequently by the data
logger to watch the one-off processes, which should have a fairly deterministic
completion rate. However, it can also be used by other processes who are going
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to execute an important task that has an approximately known time to complete,
but it is not periodic. Thus, a temporary watch should be able to be requested
any number of times, for any process.
When watching static processes, the watchdog should be capable of detecting
erroneous behavior by looking at the actual behavior of the process, where possi-
ble. If an error is detected, the offending process should be killed. The watchdog
does not need to concern itself with re-spawning the process because other Linux
system mechanisms can be utilized for this, such as init. If a process has been
killed a significant number of times, this may suggest a latch-up exists in the sys-
tem memory and a graceful shutdown should be initiated. A graceful shut down
is one where the processes are alerted to clean up and prepare for termination.
In all cases other than when a shutdown has been initiated, the software
watchdog is required to tap the external watchdog. The hardware watchdog
should not be tapped if a potential SEE has been detected, so that a hard reboot
of the system will be initiated and hopefully clear all SEEs. A hard reboot will
cause power to be removed from the entire system for a duration of time sufficient
to cause the power plane to drop down to ground and clear any latch-ups.
In addition to the external watchdog, the software watchdog is also respon-
sible for tapping the internal watchdog, which will initiate a soft reboot when
not tapped before the timeout. The software watchdog must only start tapping
the internal watchdog after the system has been confirmed to have booted into
minimum functionality, so that the system is not stuck in a half-booted state.
The last requirement for the watchdog is that it must have a command to
verify configuration changes. The watchdog should be able to receive both the
command and the signature from the ground, so that it can validate that the re-
configuration is both a permitted and correct change. If the configuration change
is valid, the watchdog is responsible for informing the inquiring process that it
can use the desired change.
5.2.3 General Implementation
The watchdog has been developed as individual static process, so that it can
leverage all of the standard PolySat library capabilities. This section details the
general approach for the implementation of the major watchdog features, such as
the process watching and configuration validation.
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The event handler in particular is heavily utilized: the static process watching
is based around one regularly scheduled event, each registered temporary process
has its own scheduled event, and there is a task for tapping the internal watchdog.
Also, in order to register a process for watching or request command verification,
commands are sent to the watchdog on its well-known UDP port. Lastly, in order
to accomplish the verification, the API provided by the cryptography component
of the library is used.
5.2.4 Static Process Watching Implementation
The most complex aspect of the software watchdog is the static process watching
with four distinct stages, shown in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: Static Process Watching - Flow Diagram of Watching Static Processes.
The first stage is asynchronous, triggered by incoming requests from other
processes to be watched. The request includes the process name, which is stored
in a hash table where the port number is the key. A fairly small table is able to
be used because the static processes in the system will likely never exceed ten.
This data structure also includes the state of the process, which is utilized in each
of the different stages. When the request is received, the “watched” state bit is
asserted, so that the next stage will know to send it a status request.
In the status request stage, the hash table is iterated through and all pro-
cesses that have the “watched” state bit asserted get a status command sent to
them. After the command is sent, the “status requested” state bit is set. This is
important so that in the final stage only processes that have been sent a status
command are expected to issue a response. After all status queries have been
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issued, stage (4) is scheduled for five seconds in the future.
The next stage, status validation, is asynchronous because it depends on the
other processes to respond to the status query. When the status packet is received,
it is analyzed to verify that the sending process has been operating correctly
since the last query. The analysis implementation is detailed in the following
subsection. If the process is found to be operating correctly, a status bit is set to
indicate this. Otherwise, if the status has been found to be invalid, it is indicated
in a separate field that counts the number of invalid responses.
The final stage occurs precisely five seconds after the status queries have been
issued to give the processes a reasonable amount of time to respond and also so
that the external watchdog can be tapped at a regular rate. In this stage, the list
is iterated through for the final time and the status bits are examined to ensure
that all processes who were queried for a status have provided a valid response.
This state bit is checked to guarantee that a process who has requested to be
watched in between states (2) and (4) is not expected to issue a status response,
even though it will be marked as watched.
If a process has not been indicated to have provided a valid status response,
the watchdog will confirm that it is still running based on continuity between
the .pid and .proc files (generated for all processes in the initialize process, see
Section 4.3.7). If the process has already exited cleanly, these files will be have
been removed. It also protects against one of the files being corrupted or another
.pid file created with the same id because the two files need to match before a
kill operation will be initiated.
Proceeding an attempted shutdown of a process, a variable in the process
table entry is incremented that indicates how many times it has not provided a
correct response. If this number exceeds five, a system wide signal will be issued
to gracefully shutdown and then the entire system will get a hard reboot after
a significant amount of time initiated by the external watchdog. If the system
has not been requested to shut down, the external watchdog will be tapped to
prevent a reboot.
5.2.5 Status Verification Implementation
The status verification process is key to the software watchdog’s ability to deter-
mine the state of the watched processes.
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Generally, the status for a process will contain a variable that is incremented
after some kind of useful, regular event has been completed. However, some
processes do not have periodic events, so receiving a status packet is deemed
sufficient to indicate that the process is operating correctly because in order to
issue a response, the primary components of the process must be working (e.g.
event handler, command handler, and inter-process communications).
The contents of the status packet varies based on the actual function of the
process who sent it, but the beacon is a simple example to examine. The beacon
status contains two important fields: beacon rate and beacon count. The watch-
dog will keep track of the beacon count between each status query so that it can
find the total beacons issued since the last request, and then use the beacon rate
to derive what the actual number of beacons issued should have been. If the
beacon count delta is found to be within the allowable window, it is marked as
validated.
5.2.6 Temporary Process Watching Implementation
In order to register a temporary process, the following information is sent to the
watchdog: the process ID of the watched process, a task ID, the maximum du-
ration for the task, and an indicator of whether or not the requester should be
informed if the process is killed by the watchdog. The process ID is provided
so that requesters can start a watch on a process other than itself. The task ID
is used to enable multiple watches per process and can be used by the request-
ing process to provide a meaningful task identification with a particular watch.
Additionally, these two values are combined to generate a key into a hash table
where this information is stored.
After an entry in the table is created with the parameters, an event is scheduled
for the expected duration time in the future with a callback function that will
kill the process. This event can be cancelled by sending a command to the
watchdog with the process and task ID. The last parameter of the temporary
process registration is relevant to this callback function, as well. A message
will be sent to the requester of the watch after the process is killed, if its been
requested. This cancellation command also has another parameter, which can be
used primarily for debugging, indicating whether the watch is being cancelled as
a result of successful completion or another reason.
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5.2.7 Command Validation Implementation
The last aspect of the watchdog is the command validation, which is implemented
as a single command. The implementation of the command is fairly simple, thanks
to the cryptography API (Section 5.1) because the watchdog just receives the data
and signature from another process, then runs the validation algorithms on it and
returns the command to the process if it is validated. Additionally, this provides
the watchdog with an opportunity to record the command data if it is relevant
to the static process watching.
If the command validates, it will send the command back to the process with
the signature intact, and the process will essentially replay the command. On
the other hand, if the command does not validate, only an error will be logged
and the process does not need to be notified since it would have already been
configured to its default operating parameters.
Upon receiving the command back at the inquiring process, it will get vali-
dated once again because it will go through the command handler and it must
be a protected command if a signature was used (see Section 4.3.2). This second
check is necessary because it ensures that no bits had been corrupted after the
message was sent back from the watchdog and will guarantee that the process is
utilizing a configuration change that is both correct and valid.
5.2.8 Detection and Recovery Limitations
The software watchdog is unfortunately not an ideal solution for dealing with
radiation events due to a variety of factors.
First and foremost, the granularity of the watch period is limited by the
external hardware watchdog period, which is currently sixty seconds. This makes
it difficult to watch processes with regular events that occur at a period that is
far greater than this time with high accuracy because a decision needs to be made
at a relatively high frequency about tapping the external watchdog.
The watchdog also currently does not have any capabilities to detect if a pro-
cess is regularly causing reboots of the system, which may indicate a permanent
corruption in the process binary. This type of behavior would have to be deter-
mined from the ground, as a result of the telemetry collected from the watchdog.
A fix for this type of problem would also rely on the currently pending image
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upload capability.
Furthermore, the reaction to an isolated watchdog process failure will likely
have a far higher cost (in time and power) due to reliance on the internal watch-
dog to reset the processor in this event. If a second, independently developed,
watchdog were utilized, so that each software watchdog could watch each other,
the cost of an isolated failure in either would be far lower because the failed
module could just be reset like a normal process failure. This is proposed as rec-
ommended future work (Section 8.3), to increase the robustness of the software
watchdog.
5.2.9 Results
A number of tests have been run on the watchdog to validate the expected be-
haviors of the module. The current implementation of the watchdog has been
confirmed to behave correctly in the situations shown in the Table 5.2, which
includes all of the major requirements. Other tests still need to be completed
with the hardware watchdogs and the entire set of degraded processes to fully
validate these watchdog features. Additionally, timing tests have been completed
to determine the time it takes, from start to finish, of validating a configura-
tion change for another process; these results are shown in Table 5.3. General
process related statistics for the watchdog, such as stored and run-time memory
requirements, are shown in the general system results, Section 4.4.
The timing results were gathered over a series of 144 validations, with varying
rates and a few process restarts in between to approximate potential actual behav-
ior. Considering that two UDP messages are sent and the signature is verified at
both the destination and the source (by the command handler), the time required
is fairly minimal. On average, only 19.6 ms are required starting from when the
requesting process sends the message until the command returns. The maximum
time was shown to occur only on the first attempt and then there appear to be
significant benefits from system caching, as indicated by the average.
The watchdog component provides a few critical features to the software sys-
tem: it alleviates the burden of validating data from each process through com-
mand verification, in addition to observing and validating the operations of the
static processes. The implementation results have shown that this is accomplished
relatively efficiently and at little cost to the overall system.
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Aspect Event
Static Processes
Single process operating normally
Multiple processes operating normally
Single process operating incorrectly
Multiple process with some operating incorrectly
After 5 failures, shutdown signal issued
Temp. Processes
Single temp process watch, successful completion
Multiple temp process watch, successful completion
Single temp process watch, terminated
Multiple temp process watched, some terminated
Command Validation Only correct commands sent for validation are returned to process
Table 5.2: Validated Requirements for Watchdog - Requirements for the watchdog
that have been successfully implemented and demonstrated.
Event Min. Average Max
End-To-End Command Validation 17.5ms 19.6 ms 27 ms
Table 5.3: Watchdog Command Validation Timing Results - Timing results from
the command validation watchdog feature, indicating how much time elapsed starting from
when the request was issued ..XXX
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6Related Satellite Projects
6.1 Summary of Projects
Satellite [§] Organization Main Mhz Volatile Non-Volatile Operating
Processor Memory Memory System
1st Gen PolySat [2] Cal Poly PIC18F6720 4 3.75KB 256KB custom
2nd Gen PolySat [4] Cal Poly AT91SAM9G20 400 64MB 528MB Linux
BeeSat-1 [6.2] Technical Unv. of Berlin LPC2292 60 2MB 16MB TinyBOSS
Cute-1.7 [6.3] Tokyo Institute ARMV4I 400 32MB 128MB Windows
of Technology CE.NET
ITU-pSAT [6.4] Istanbul Technical Unv. MSP430 8 10KB 55KB Salvo
KySat-1 [6.5] Kentucky Space MSP430 N/A N/A N/A Salvo
MEROPE [6.6] Montana State MC68HC812A4 8 1KB 154KB custom
QuakeSat [6.8] Stanford University ZFx86 486 100 16MB 1MB Linux
STUDSAT [6.9] India - 7 Academic AT91SAM9260 180 64KB 512KB VxWorks
Institutions
PW-Sat [6.7] Warsaw Unv. of Tech. AT91SAM7X 55MIPS 256KB 2MB FreeRTOS
UWE-1 [6.10] University of Wuerzburg H8S-2674R N/A 8MB 4.5MB µCLinux
Table 6.1: Comparison of processing specifications and operating systems of
CubeSats - These projects were chosen based on availability of published design and
specification documents. The section is given where they are discussed in this paper.
A number of related satellite projects were surveyed in order to facilitate and
support this design. A list of these satellites and their computing specifications
are shown in Table 6.1, including the first and second generation Cal Poly designs.
A link to the section is also given where a summary is given of works published
about the project’s software system, followed by an analysis of the system and a
comparison to the new PolySat system, when possible.
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6.2 Dependable Software (BOSS) For the BEESat Pico
Satellite
BEESat is a CubeSat developed primarily by the Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics of the Technical University of Berlin in Germany. BEESat makes
the claim of being the ”first pico-satellite with a fault tolerant design” [18], which
is implemented at a variety of levels.
6.2.1 BEESat Spacecraft
The satellite contains the typical subsystems, including the on board data han-
dling (OBDH), power, communication, ADCS, and payload.
The OBDH consists of two redundant microprocessors, ARM7 microcon-
trollers each with 16MB flash memory and a redundant CAN interface for inter-
subsystem communications. This subsystem controls the typical communication
components (transceiver and modem), which transmits to the groundstation in
the UHF band. The OBDH also controls the ADCS subsystem that has the ca-
pability of 3-axis stabilization through the use of 3 microwheels. The satellite
also has a camera as the payload, which communicates with its own microcon-
troller that is implemented with cold redundancy via a watchdog timer, current
protection circuitry, and backup software images.
6.2.2 Software Architecture
The BEESat satellite utilizes the BOSS real-time embedded operating system
and its provided middleware. This was chosen because the operating system
was designed specifically for safety critical applications with an emphasis on sim-
plicity. Additionally, the BOSS middleware enables communication between any
combination of software or hardware elements, which simplifies the development
process.
The middleware was specifically designed with fault tolerance in mind. The
architecture relies heavily upon asynchronous message passing with a subscriber
protocol. Any hardware or software module can subscribe to the messages of
another module; all subscribers will receive a copy of the messages from that
module. This feature makes it very simple to add logging systems or online
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system diagnosis. An extension of this system adds further fault tolerance by
providing the capability of inserting a voter between the middleware and the
module.
Different tasks in BOSS are implemented as threads, which are scheduled by
the kernel. The kernel also provides a time manager service, which provides a
64-bit counter for each node to keep track of the local time. The kernel also
provides an interrupt manager to pass interrupts to user level modules. In or-
der for this to function with the specific microcontrollers on BEESat, a small
hardware dependent layer is required for interaction with the hardware specific
components.
6.2.3 Results
BEESat was launched in September 2009 and entered a 720 km sun-synchronous
orbit. After a year on orbit, BEESat was still operating nominally and none of
the redundant subsystems were required to be activated [19].
6.2.4 Analysis
Although the BEESat system runs an RTOS and thus the low level architecture
is relatively simple, their design philosophies contain some similarities to the
PolySat system. Specifically, we also are attempting to utilize generally fault
tolerant software mechanisms.
Furthermore, the success of our project is encouraged by projects like BEESat
that have had significant on orbit operability without having to fall back on
redundant subsystems because we have decided to eliminate major redundancy
from this generation of avionics hardware.
6.3 A PDA-Controlled Pico-Satellite, Cute-1.7, and its
Radiation Protection
The Cute-1.7 pico-satellite is a PDA-controlled spacecraft developed to the Cube-
Sat specification by the Tokyo Institute of Technology [20]. The primary mission
for this satellite is to validate the usage of COTS components for future missions.
Magnatorquers were also flown to test an attitude control algorithm.
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6.3.1 The Cute-1.7 System
The satellite is developed around a term coined by the developers of the Cute-1.7
spacecraft as the “SatelliteCore.” This contains all of the primary components of
the satellites and can be joined with what is referred to as a “mission container”,
which holds the payload, to form a whole spacecraft. The SatelliteCore only
requires a standard USB interface to communicate with the payload and provides
3.3V, 5V, and unregulated power rails, to suit a variety of needs. The goal of this
method is to require only a new mission container to be developed for each new
satellite to reduce development time.
The SatelliteCore requires 1U of volume and thus it is expected that when
combined with a mission container, the entire spacecraft will be at least 2U.
Advanced features such as attitude control were left out of the SatelliteCore
design to optimize for cost and production time, rather than functionality. Satel-
liteCore aims to enable frequent access to space and adding the complexity that
these features require would make that more difficult.
In line with the goal of rapid development, the majority of the components
used are COTS devices. Specifically, parts are actually removed from end user
products rather than commercially available electronics. For example, the transceiver
used is an FM transmitter and receiver from a commercially available handheld.
Furthermore, a personal digital assistant’s circuit board is used as the main com-
puter. This computer runs the operating system Windows CE 4.1 and the pri-
mary peripheral interface is USB, both of which are (or were at the time of the
design) common enough to support the rapid development goal of the overall
SatelliteCore design.
6.3.2 Radiation Protection
A number of fault tolerance mechanisms were added to the Cute-1.7 system to
attempt to provide radiation hardening of the COTS parts. The two primary
components are a double watchdog timer system and over current protection cir-
cuitry. The watchdog system has two separate timers so that both the computer
and the real-time clock, which is isolated from the rest of the system, can be
protected.
The goal of these systems are to prevent the computer from failing as a result
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of SELs or SEUs. Sometimes an SEL can be indicated by increased current
consumption, however, given that current consumption can vary greatly based on
the CPU load, this may not be sufficient for reliable detection. The watchdogs
can aid in the event current consumption does not spike high enough to trip the
protection circuitry and ensure that power is cycled to clear the issue. When an
SEU occurs, the effect is similar: the watchdog timer will restart the system in
the event of a software halt.
The radiation protection system was validated by using a proton beam, which
was wide enough to cover nearly a quarter of the main computer’s circuit board.
This was used to force SEU and SELs to happen to the computer system and
hopefully allow observation of the recovery mechanisms. The results of this ex-
perimentation showed that the Cute-1.7 system should be able to function as
intended for approximately a year, which is a reasonable amount of time to com-
plete a CubeSat-type mission.
6.3.3 Analysis
The Cute-1.7 is one of the earliest published papers about designing a generic
CubeSat platform and thus many of their design principles and goals were similar
to those of PolySat’s current design. The PolySat design seeks to improve turn-
around times by establishing an extremely generic platform and improves upon
the Cute-1.7 concept by requiring far less volume, but also providing a larger
variety of interfaces.
Similarities are also found in the specific implementation: such as the use
of two watchdog timers in the PolySat system, to protect both the CPU and
the other components in the system from radiation events. The PolySat system
hopes to provide further protection at the software level, as well. Additionally,
PolySat also chose a commercially available operating system to enable the usage
of common tools and languages, which were the likely motivations for Cute-1.7’s
usage of the Windows CE operating system.
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6.4 iTU-pSat: Istanbul Technical University’s Student Pico-
Satellite Program
iTU-pSAT I is a 1U CubeSat and the first student-designed pico-satellite of
Turkey [21]. It contains two payloads, both developed in-house: a low-resolution
camera and a two-axis passive stabilization experiment. Its system is mostly com-
prised of COTS parts, with the structure and C&DH board acquired as part of
the CubeSat Kit from Pumpkin Inc. The satellite was launched was in 2009 and
was beaconing regularly as of spring of 2011 [22]. The on-board modem failed
shortly after the launch and thus uplink to the satellite has not been possible.
6.4.1 Software
iTU-pSat also utilizes the real-time operating system provided by Pumpkin Inc.,
Salvo. The guiding design principle for their software architecture was to encap-
sulate one function or feature per task. The function of the main controller is
primarily to control and collect data from other subsystems via I2C, and then
dividing that information into packages for transmitting to the ground. The sys-
tem has been designed such that it can boot from only the flash memory of the
microcontroller in the event of external memories failing.
6.4.2 Analysis
The iTU-pSat satellite is another example of a university project that was made
possible by COTS parts, but it is unclear if future missions are planned with this
system. Further details are necessary regarding the implementation of their soft-
ware architecture and fault tolerance to determine the extensibility or flexibility
of the system.
6.5 KySat-1: A Kentucky Space 1U CubeSat
The KySat-1 CubeSat was developed as a collaborative effort, by the Kentucky
Space consortium. It has a 1U form factor and uses almost entirely all COTS
parts, including both the electronics and structure from Pumpkin Inc. and Clyde
Space Ltd [23]. The primary mission of KySat-1 was to attract the interest of
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K-12 students in the STEM field through various interaction with the satellite
while in orbit. KySat-1 was launched with the ELaNa-1 [24] mission in March
2011, but unfortunately did not reach orbit due to launch vehicle failure [25].
6.5.1 System, Requirements, and Software Infrastructure
KySat-1 utilizes an MSP430 microcontroller with the Salvo OS, both provided
by the Pumpkin Inc., for their C&DH subsystem. Salvo is an RTOS specifically
designed for small applications [26]. The software that ran within this operating
system was designed by the Kentucky Space team and developed as part of their
goal to create a “reliable and reusable CubeSat [system] architecture” [27].
The team developed a set of functional requirements, which included both the
general and payload specific functionality. They dictated various high-level func-
tions such as being able to configure the satellite before launch, providing com-
mand scheduling and execution, telemetry reporting, and capturing photographs.
In order to support meeting these requirements, Kentucky Space needed to
create a software development infrastructure, since one did not exist prior to this
project. Some of the decisions to develop this infrastructure included deciding
to utilize a common version control system, SVN, standardize the development
environment, and run a static analysis tool, Cleanscape C++ Lint, on all flight
code.
Several strategies were also employed to aid development. The software was
built in revisions, such that each revision was a potential flight candidate, if
the schedule necessitated it. Four flight-ready revisions were released of the flight
software, including the final fully-functional one. The software was also developed
with a highly modular architecture, in order to facilitate dividing work amongst
developers and simplifying future code modifications. Extensive work was put
into designing the module interfaces to insure they were simple and intuitive to
use. Lastly, each module was required to be reviewed by another programmer
before being accepted as flight code.
6.5.2 Flight Software Overview
The KySat software architecture is divided up into a large number of modules,
where each exists as a task or a set of tasks within the operating system. To
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multiplex access to the hardware within tasks that used shared peripherals, global
semaphores are used; in order to share data between tasks, queues are utilized.
The system is driven primarily by groundstation commands: data is received
by one of the tasks that interfaces with a radio, it is decoded by the corresponding
driver, then sent to a packet receive task where it is sent to queue that feeds to
a command executor or to the transmitters, if the packet is to be “repeated”
(sent back over the air). Once the command executor receives the command, it
is parsed and it can either be scheduled to be executed immediately, or at a later
time. When an action is taken, the command executor is also responsible for
issuing an acknowledgement to the ground.
There are also several modules implemented for specific commands. This
includes both a digital and continuous wave beacon, a few file system related
commands, and a telemetry window command, which initiates a high rate of data
recording for a set of sensors. The output of the telemetry window command is
written to an ASCII-formatted file, which can be downlinked during or after the
window is completed. Other commands utilize files, as well, such as those related
to images and audio playback; all files are stored on an SD card.
The approach for general telemetry storage is somewhat unique in that they
simulate a database through the use of macros that point to different indices in
one large array. Each telemetry point has a specific macro that is used, which
contains the specific index for that point. These telemetry points are updated
at a rate of once per second, enabling other software modules to read from the
database in RAM to get a reasonable recent value rather than reading from the
sensor itself. Most modules in the system write to at least one telemetry point.
6.5.3 Fault Tolerance
Most of the components in the KySat-1 system have little or no flight heritage
and thus several fault tolerant mechanisms have been utilized to help mitigate
the risks.
The system relies on two watchdogs to protect against hang-ups that can
occur as a result of radiation events. The first watchdog is internal to the mi-
crocontroller and is configured to timeout in just a second, but it is tapped at a
rate double that, unconditionally, within a system task. When this system task
is running, it indicates that the scheduler is functioning properly, which is a key
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to the correct operation of the entire system. The second watchdog is external to
the microcontroller, has a longer timeout of sixty seconds, and is able to perform
a hard reset of the system. This watchdog is also tapped at a rate double the
timeout, but only when all of the global semaphores in the system have been
freed, indicating that there is no dead-lock. It is noted that this does add com-
plexity, but that it is worthwhile to insure the system can recover from improper
semaphore usage.
In order to protect against radiation events that can alter data in the EEP-
ROMs, where satellite parameters and settings are stored, the hardware library
stores all values in three locations within the memory. A voting system is used
whenever a read of the EEPROM is executed, and in the event that one of the
three values is incorrect, the correct value can still be returned, and it is also
written back out to fix the corrupted location. If more than one location has
become corrupted that is associated with a single value, the values will get set to
their default/launch value. A system reset command is also implemented to allow
for all of these values to get reset, in case the satellite appears to be operating
incorrectly in spite of these mechanisms.
There is also a module that is dedicated to monitoring the activity of the
system. Generally, the satellite will be interacted with at least once every ten
days, thus, if no packets have been received within ten days, it is probable that
some kind of critical error has occurred. When this is detected, this error scanning
module will utilize the system reset command to return the satellite to its default
configuration, in an attempt to clear the error. The error scanning module is also
responsible for sniffing parameter changing packets that come to the satellite, and
if a parameter is found to be requested that is outside of the acceptable range,
the parameter is restored to its default value.
An additional mode has also been designed in the event of no communications
for ten days. When the satellite reboots into the default configuration mode, as
a result of the error scanning module, the worst case is assumed and antenna
deployment is re-attempted. After this, if no packets are received for another
three days, the satellite is booted into a system recovery mode. In this mode, a
minimum set of hardware and software is used in hope that none of the critical
components have been permanently damaged. Additionally, in this mode, the
system toggles between the two primary radios and issues continuous wave bea-
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cons every 4.5 minutes. Only two commands are available to the ground station
operator at this point: normal reboot, or normal reboot with a new default radio.
The beacon contains information to determine which of these are the appropriate
choice for recovery.
6.5.4 Analysis
KySat-1 is another project whose software system was developed with similar
overall goals to the new PolySat system: an extensible, modular, generally fault
tolerant software architecture. The approach differs a bit due to the usage of
a lower power microcontroller, with the Salvo RTOS. This design choice has
required the KySat-1 team to seemingly integrate a lot of non-generic code inside
their command path, in order to handle forwarding commands to payload specific
modules. It is unclear whether or not a generic method of implementing this was
utilized. This was a pitfall of the first generation PolySat design, and intentionally
avoided in the new design by enabling each process to simply handle their own
commands with the provided command handler.
Furthermore, the use of an RTOS required extensive use of low-level operating
system objects and services, such as semaphores and queues, which they admit-
ted adds fairly significant complexity. The PolySat system was able to avoid this
by leveraging abstractions of similar concepts that already existed in the Linux
kernel and standard libraries. The same can be said for the custom “database”
implementation for KySat-1; rather than a custom implementation, the PolySat
system was able to leverage a commonly used implementation, SQLite. Further-
more, using an RTOS at Cal Poly would likely fundamentally result in a steeper
learning curve, because there are no lower level courses that teach programming
in such an environment, and until recently there was not even a higher level one.
As for the fault tolerance methods, KySat-1’s usage of watchdogs is extremely
similar to PolySat’s. Specifically the use of two hardware watchdogs, where one
is unconditionally tapped at a high rate, and another with a condition tapped at
a lower rate. The implementation differs a bit though, in that the functionality
of PolySat’s software watchdog exists partially throughout the KySat-1 system,
such as the parameter validation. However, there is no mention of validating
the correct operation of the modules, which is a feature provided by PolySat’s
software watchdog and can be used for detection of radiation events.
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KySat-1 does provide some fault tolerance mechanisms that are not included
in the PolySat system, such as the redundant parameter storage. It is believed
that the checksums used to validate the file system in the bootup process are
sufficient to detect permanent faults and that voting systems such as this add
significant overhead and complexity in a place that has not fundamentally been
identified to be a consistent source of errors.
The failure modes are also an interesting concept that the PolySat system
has implemented a minimal form of (degraded versus full functionality modes),
but has avoided due to the lack of operational history suggesting such modes
are necessary. The KySat-1 implementation mostly focuses on communication
system failure, which the Cal Poly missions seemingly identified as a consistently
reliable system, whereas it was the C&DH component that was mostly likely to
fail. Thus, the majority of efforts seem to be best spent making the primary
computer robust to failures rather than the components around it.
6.6 MEROPE: Montana EaRth Orbiting Pico-Explorer
(MEROPE) Cubesat-class Satellite
The MEROPE spacecraft was a 1U CubeSat that was launched on the failed
DNEPR-1 rocket in 2006 [28]. It was the first satellite developed by Montana
State University and its primary goal was to be a modern day version of the
Explorer-1 science payload [29].
6.6.1 C&DH Hardware
The project was entirely student run and low budget, which necessitated the use
of mostly COTS components. Since no radiation hardened components could be
afforded, goals and requirements for the mission were decided appropriately. The
mission was only required to last four months and only a 40 KHz data rate from
the payload was needed. The microcontroller chosen to support this mission was
the 16 bit MC68HC812A4 (commonly referred to as the HC12), running at 16
MHz with 1KB of RAM, a 4KB EEPROM for program storage, and a 150KB
FIFO RAM device for external memory.
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6.6.2 Software
The software was programmed in assembly, which was chosen for its minimized
code space requirements in comparison to C. As a result, the software is a fairly
simple interrupt driven architecture. The main loop is responsible only for teleme-
try monitoring and storage, tapping the watchdog, and checking the receive buffer
for data. All other activities on the satellite are initiated by interrupts. Interrupts
insure that the desired data rate can be achieved.
Two different modes of operation were programmed for the MEROPE system:
probe and on-orbit. The probe mode is used primarily during development and is
entered when a serial cable is attached and the batteries are being charged. In this
mode, systems diagnostics run, and the chip can be reprogrammed. In on-orbit
mode, all activities of the satellite are autonomous. There are three phases in this
mode, the first is when the satellite is first deployed from the P-POD and it must
wait a certain period of time to deploy the antennae, to prevent collisions with
other spacecraft. The second phase is normal operations, which is entered after
the antennae have been deployed, and the standard main loop is run. The third
and final is the transmitting phase, which occurs when the satellite is overhead
Montana State University’s ground station and data is being sent over the air
from the satellite to the ground station.
6.6.3 Analysis
This is one of the earlier CubeSat missions and thus, it has more parallels to the
first generation PolySat design than the newer one. The concept of a main loop
that manages the telemetry, and all other activities are triggered by interrupts
is very similar. However, given that it was programmed in assembly, it is even
simpler in implementation.
This project is included to show the significant technology leaps that CubeSat
C&DH electronics and software have made in just the past decade.
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6.7 PW-Sat on-board flight computer, hardware and soft-
ware design
The PW-Sat is a CubeSat developed by various faculty of the Warsaw University
of Technology in Poland [30]. It’s primary goal is to demonstrate a satellite
deorbiting mechanism based on a shape memory alloy sail, which could be used a
cheap method for removing spacecraft from low earth orbits. In addition to this
experiment, they are also flying an RTOS-based software system, which runs on
an ARM7 microcontroller.
6.7.1 Hardware Design
The on board computer for PW-Sat consists of an Atmel AT91SAM7X ARM7
microcontroller, which operates at a speed of 55 MIPS. For telemetry and sched-
uled command storage, a 16 megabit DataFlash component is used. A one-wire
bus is utilized to interface the microcontroller with a temperature sensor and the
radio communication module.
Based on the analysis of their intended orbit, they expect to receive 1 krad of
total ionizing dose every 30-days and it is believed that the commercial CMOS
components that have been selected should continue to operate nominally.
6.7.2 Software Design
The software design is mostly based around the FreeRTOS real time operating
system. One of the stated reasons for choosing this system is that it can be used
on a variety of hardware platforms.
The software architecture is highly modularized, with each module existing
as a FreeRTOS task. Communication is accomplished by using different built-in
services and objects like queues and semaphores. There are ten unique software
modules, which each accomplish very specific tasks for the spacecraft.
The first module is the “USART Communication Module”, which is respon-
sible for the RS232 interface and low-level control of the satellite’s radio. After
commands are received by this task, they are sent to the “Telecommand Parser
and Validator”, which first authenticates the commands using a keyed-Hash Mes-
sage Authentication Code utilizing the SHA256 algorithm. Each command has a
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32 character signature, which relies on the secrecy of the key that is used to gen-
erate and validate the signature. After verification of the signature, the module
converts the command into binary and sends it to the “Telecommand Scheduler”.
The scheduler is responsible for queuing received commands for execution,
either in a relative time or absolute. The capabilities for repeating the commands
with a specified period, removing commands, and viewing the currently scheduled
commands are also provided. One of the challenges faced in the implementation
of this module was providing persistence between system resets. The approach
they ended up using was periodically writing out the contents of the queue to
their flash memory. The downside of this option was that commands between the
last save and a reset would be lost, but the frequency was high enough to reduce
the likelihood of losing a significant number of commands. With the command
state, a persistent time stamp was written out as well, in lieu of an onboard real
time clock, to enable consistent time keeping. Once a scheduled command is to
be executed, it gets sent to the “Telecommand Router”, which is a very simple
module that merely places the command in the appropriate queue.
The other modules provide higher-level functionality, such as the sensors mod-
ule, which gathers voltage and temperature information from the on-board sen-
sors. The “House-Keeping Module” also uses this sensor data, in order to monitor
the state of the spacecraft and send out alerts to the system if sensor values exceed
certain upper or lower bounds.
The next module is responsible for overall system health and observation, the
“System Module”. It contains a software watchdog component, which collects
heart beats from every module in the system, in order to detect deadlock. When
every heart beat is collected, a hardware watchdog is tapped.This module also
keeps track of the reason for reboots, logging the past 50 reset causes, and also
the past 50 failing modules as detected by the watchdog.
The last two modules are for collecting and archiving telemetry from other
modules. The general telemetry module is solely responsible for sending telemetry
to the communication module. Priorities are given to each telemetry packet: low,
normal, or high. High is used exclusively for data only packets, but the typical
telemetry packet will be assigned a normal priority. The data is removed from
the queue based on the priority as soon as the on board computer has been
informed the radio is ready to transmit. Since the opportunity for transmitting
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data to the groundstation is very limited, these queued telemetry packets need to
be archived, which the second module is responsible for. Each archive entry has
a time stamp and is saved inside the 2MB memory, which is treated as a circular
buffer (a maximum of about 15000 packets can be stored at a time).
The final aspect of the software discussed is software redundancy. In general,
the system relies on the hardware watchdog to recover from single event upsets
and latch-ups. However, if there have been 15 consecutive restarts, the system
will enter a safe mode. This safe mode utilizes redundant code and redundant
SRAM memory, in order to maximize reliability, and implements the minimum
functionality required to generate and broadcast telemetry packets. After 15 min-
utes of operation in this safe mode, the system will forcibly restart and attempt
to reenter the normal mode.
6.7.3 Analysis
The PW-Sat software architecture bears many resemblances to PolySat’s new
design. Other than the underlying operating system difference (FreeRTOS versus
Linux), the approaches are nearly identical: reliance on a higher power processor
to enable significant software modularity. Parallels can be found in nearly all
of the modules, such as the communication, telemetry, and system/watchdog
modules.
However, there were a number of modules that the PolySat design did not
require a custom implementation thanks to an existing one in Linux. For example,
the majority of our command routing is provided by the Linux kernel with the
well-known port numbers rather than implementing a custom module as PW-Sat
was required to do. Additionally, they required a custom format for storing their
telemetry packages, whereas our design was able to leverage the SQLite package,
which enables numerous other features besides efficient storage.
The software redundancy strategy is also fairly similar to that of PolySat’s sys-
tem, with a reliance primarily on the watchdog to initiate restarts upon detection
of a radiation event. The similarities do not stop there either, both systems have
a degraded operation mode which can be used to attempt to recover from signif-
icant failures. However, the implementation differs slightly due to the intended
recovery option. The PW-Sat does not have any mentioned code upload capabil-
ities and thus the only way to recover from a serious failure is to wait it out. As
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for the PolySat system, work is being done to be able to upload an entirely new
image, which would enable recovery from both transient and permanent faults in
the software image.
The PW-Sat software design is an interesting precursor design to the new
PolySat design. The new system hopes to relieve the burden of requiring the
developer to learn a new operating system by utilizing Linux instead of FreeRTOS.
FreeRTOS should provide the better performance overall, but the limited selection
of open-source/free code available and the likely increased learning curve are
significant detractors in an educational environment.
6.8 QuakeSat Lessons Learned: Notes from the Development
of a Triple CubeSat
QuakeSat [31] was a three unit CubeSat that succesfully flew powered by a Linux-
running CPU. The duration of the entire project was 18 months and in that time
it was succesfully built, launched, and operated for a number of months. This
paper details their lessons learned from this mission, specifically regarding the
differences of developing a CubeSat versus a larger satellite.
6.8.1 Operating System Selection
The relevant portion of the paper to this thesis is the discussion of their software
system. The QuakeSat mission selected a COTS single board computer, which
came with a fully functional Linux OS. The availability of this OS was a driving
factor in their decision because they did not have to write any I/O drivers and thus
could focus on higher-level software and payload integration. The choice of Linux
as an operating system was based on the availability of third-party software, such
as AX.25 support, ease of development, and compatibility with existing ground
systems. Furthermore, they found numerous utilities for software telemetry and
also utilized the existing IP network stack within Linux. Thanks to all of the
existing Linux code-base and support, the QuakeSat team only had to write
10,000 lines of code, only 30% of which was device driver code.
The QuakeSat team did recognize some disadvantages to using Linux though,
for example they found more testing was required due to the greater flexibility
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provided by the existing code. Additionally, they acknowledged the time was not
taken to validate the large number of files that are required to support the Linux
kernel and thus they were not able to guarantee the validity of the operating
system.
6.8.2 Satellite Software
The satellite software architecture primarily consisted of independent programs.
The programs had few or no interdependencies and thus enabled concurrent de-
velopment with minimal interfacing between the developers. As a result, this
reduced “development cost, development time, and software complexity”. One
of the other stated benefits of this type of architecture is that the overall risk is
reduced for the programs because no interaction means little chance of locking
up from a race condition that went untested.
The software architecture can be described as having four distinct layers: op-
erating system (Linux), device drivers and watchdog, command handling, and
applications. The command handling is done by the “QuakeSat Executive”,
which receives a command and sends a respond, to ensure for every packet up
there is one packet down. Three primary application types are used: beacon,
which sends telemetry information, file upload/download programs, and worker
programs, for executing “time-tagged” sets of commands (i.e. a multi-day exper-
iment). Additionally, scripts were used to perform a large number of operations
on the spacecraft, such as maintenance, control other programs, and sometimes
execute payload commands.
After the launch of QuakeSat, testing revealed that the existing flight software
needed to be modified. Due to the modular structure of the software, the team was
able to upload new code without bringing the system down entirely. Typically,
the replacement file was uploaded with a new name and then the appropriate
scripts were modified to use the new name, allowing the previous copy to exist
as a backup.
As the mission progressed, scripts were also modified to move towards auto-
mated operations as the mission became a “highly-refined set of predetermined
tasks.”
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6.8.3 Analysis
Given that both QuakeSat and the new PolySat avionics software system run on
the Linux kernel, there are a number of direct comparisons that can be made
between the two. The majority of the reasons given by the QuakeSat team
for using Linux, such as the existing IP network stack, were factors in PolySat’s
decision, as well. However, PolySat opted out of some of the third-party software,
like the AX.25 support, in favor of a lightweight, custom solution, that will be
optimized and potentially replaced in the near future for higher network efficiency.
QuakeSat’s software architecture running atop Linux also contains a number
of similarities to the PolySat design. At the highest level, both systems utilize
processes that are mostly independently functioning. The primary difference lies
in the fact that QuakeSat opts for a command handler layer, whereas PolySat
chose to have each process individually manage their commands, to allow for
maximum amount of flexibility and code isolation. The PolySat process library
provides all of the necessary command handling infrastructure in a generic fash-
ion, such that an individual process for handling this is not needed.
Both spacecraft utilize a beacon process for periodic telemetry broadcasts;
but, in the PolySat system, for scheduled events the data logger is used as a
generic interface for spawning one-off events or experiments rather than a number
of “worker programs”, as QuakeSat uses. This enables greater flexibility for
adding different experiments and does not restrict them to be written in the
same language as the core system functionality.
As the architecture is designed, there is no specific infrastructure for code
uploading and replacing. However, this is being developed as a future thesis and
should be available in the near future after the completion of this work.
6.9 STUDSAT: India’s First Student Pico-Satellite Project
STUDSAT is a pico-satellite developed by a group of about 40 students from the
Indian Engineering Colleges of Hyderabad and Bangalore [32]. The form factor
for the satellite is approximately a 1U CubeSat, as a result of a camera lens that
extends out an additional 3.5 CM in the +Z direction (to result in overall dimen-
sions of 10cm x 10cm x13.5cm). In addition to the camera, also included is an
ADCS subsystem with pointing accuracy to 1 degree. For the system electronics,
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the satellite uses an off-the-shelf power system from Clyde Space, but has a cus-
tom C&DH board centered around an AVR32-based UC3A0512 microcontroller,
which is supported by a 512 kB Ferroelectric Random Access Memory (FRAM)
non-volatile memory.
STUDSAT was launched in July 2010 and was successfully transmitting, how-
ever, due to high amounts of noise, no packets were able to be decoded.
6.9.1 Software Architecture
STUDSAT utilizes a widely used RTOS, VxWorks, for its operating system. The
architecture they have chosen is known as a shared load ring architecture [33]: on
the innermost ring is the operating system, the next level are the applications,
and on the outermost ring are the drivers. Their device drivers are independent
blocks of code, which are used as the building blocks to construct an application.
The satellite was programmed to have three different modes of execution:
mission, launch, and check out. In mission mode, the satellite is performing
operations related to the desired mission sequence, such as taking pictures, or
establishing a link with the ground station. Immediately after launch, the satellite
enters launch mode, which is responsible for executing a series of tasks that
need to occur after entering orbit, like antenna deployment and de-tumbling the
spacecraft. The other mode is called “check out mode” and is used on the ground
for testing purposes. Its operations includes a test procedure to validate the
functionality of each of the individual subsystems, and it also enables passing
commands to the satellite through a UART or USB connection.
There are also three power modes that affect the operations of the spacecraft
and are controlled by the software monitoring the power levels. In emergency
mode, all systems are disabled except for the C&DH and power systems; the
C&DH is only responsible for periodically checking the power level and logging
the telemetry. If the power level recovers, the satellite will enter low power mode,
where the beacon module will also be enabled, which will transmit the basic
telemetry data every two minutes. The last is “optimum” power mode, where all
modules can be used, on an as needed basis. This includes continuing to keep
track of the power levels and beaconing, as well as establishing a communication
link with the ground station, attitude determination and control, taking images,
and performing general housekeeping.
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6.9.2 Analysis
This is the only satellite looked at using the VxWorks operating system, but
its architecture is fairly similar to the others using an RTOS. Few details are
given about the separation of the tasks so it is difficult to say whether or not
the STUDSAT team intentionally designed for modularity in their software, but
the tasks that have been presented seem to indicate they have mostly done that.
Unfortunately, little is presented about which, if any, fault tolerance mechanisms
have been used either. Thus, STUDSAT serves as an interesting subject due
to its relatively unique hardware and operating system, but it is hard to make
a comparison to the new PolySat software system due to the lack of details
available.
6.10 The UWE-1 and UWE-2 Satellites
Students from the University of Wuerzburg, Germany developed a 1U CubeSat,
UWE-1, which was launched in October 2005. The UWE-1 satellite’s primary
mission was to test a number of different IP-based protocols such as TCP, UDP,
and SCTP in orbit[34]. Following the UWE-1 mission, a significant revision was
made to the software system to make it more extensible and portable for the
UWE-2 mission[35], which was launched in September 2009 [36].
6.10.1 UWE Platform
The system was built on an H8S microprocessor with 8MB of SRAM, 4MB of
Flash, and 512KB of EEPROM memory. Micro-Linux (µCLinux) is the operating
system of choice; a full version of Linux cannot be used because the CPU does
not have a memory management unit (MMU).
The communication system consists of a modified COTS transceiver, which
communicates using the amateur radio band to the ground station. The computer
system uses a specific protocol, entitled 6Pack, to interface with the transceiver.
For over-the-air communications, the AX.25 protocol is used.
The UWE-1 spacecraft also has some few fault tolerance features such as
redundant modules and a watchdog timer.
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6.10.2 UWE-1 Software
The UWE-1 software system mostly consisted of a simple program that executed
a few critical, yet simple tasks. There were four main tasks of this application:
sending beacons, collecting and transmitting sensor data, receiving commands,
and charging the batteries. The software constantly iterated through these tasks
for the entirety of the mission. The only deviation would be if a command were
received, in which case it would execute the command, and then return to the
start of the task loop again.
The UWE-1 software system was demonstrated successfully on orbit and the
mission was completed after the first few weeks.
6.10.3 UWE-2 Software
When the development of UWE-2 began, the Wuerzburg team faced the challenge
of the next generation of developers not being familiar with the previous design.
Additionally, the UWE-1 software design was not written with extensibility in
mind, and regardless of the familiarity of the new developers, it was very difficult
to add features to. In order to solve this problem, the UWE-2 team decided to
develop a new system with a focus on stability, modularity, and efficiency.
As a basis for the new software architecture, the ULF system was designed,
which is the name for the layer that exists in user space and interfaces with the
device specific software components. In order to make it simple to integrate new
components to the system, it was decided to implement each aspect of the system
in a different module.
At the focus of this design is the “main module”, which is responsible for
inter-module communication, system initialization, error handling, and direct
interfacing with the hardware through the OS. During initialization, each module
registers with this module, which will allow it to obtain access to various resources
controlled by the main module and allows the main module to keep track of the
actions of all of the modules. In addition to this tracking, the main module will
check all of the running modules periodically and if a problem is detected, the
system can restart that particular module.
A small set of modules were developed to cover the basic functionality of the
satellite: the radio control, battery control, housekeeping, logging, and sensor
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modules. The idea of including these modules in the new design is that new
developers will only have to worry about creating mission specific modules for
future missions.
The last aspect of the system that the team wanted to emphasize was the
portability. Since the majority of the software runs in user space, there are
very few hardware dependencies in the base design. The team hopes that other
satellites will be able to use the ULF system because they would only have to
exchange the satellite specific hardware drivers, if their platform was able to run
Linux, as well.
The UWE-2 software system has also been demonstrated successfully on orbit.
6.10.4 Analysis
The approach that the Wuerzburg team took to upgrade from their first software
to their second is remarkably similar to PolySat’s. Both organizations had a
mostly new team of developers who were looking to improve upon the old system
and had a strong desire to make it more extensible. The similarities do not stop
with the approach though, as both designs utilized a version of Linux that was
leveraged for numerous built-in features. Due to the selection of this operating
system choice, the resulting architectures were also analogous: a highly modular
design that segments each primary task from one another.
The primary distinction between the two systems is choice by the UWE-2
team to develop a centralized control module for messaging and resource access
control. This enables much finer grained control and logging, however, adds
significant complexity and likely reimplementation of existing code. The PolySat
system relies on the Linux kernel for message delivery via UDP sockets since that
network stack is very reliable and robust, plus the necessary features already
exist. However, some of the functionality of the UWE-2 ULF module are re-
implemented in other components of the PolySat system, such as the process
registration, which occurs in PolySat’s software watchdog module instead.
The successes of the UWE-1 and UWE-2 software systems are great indicators
for the PolySat system because it bears resemblances to both, particularly the
former.
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A number of papers were used to aid in the design of the software architecture.
These papers are summarized and their contributions to this work are detailed.
7.1 Software Implemented Fault Tolerance: Technolo-
gies and Experience
This oft-cited paper is one of the earliest ones to discuss a variety of software-only
fault tolerance techniques such as a software watchdog, checkpointing, message
logging, and recovery to said checkpoints [37]. A focus is placed on methods that
are mostly transparent to the application programmers to encourage reusability
and efficiency.
7.1.1 Model
The model for their system is a client-server based application that runs in a
local or wide-area network of computers in a distributed system. However, it is
noted these techniques apply to other types of applications, as well. The server
process is the focus of most of the methods and is commonly referred to as the
application. Furthermore, it is assumed the distributed system is in a circular
configuration, such that one neighbor .
There are a few tasks in particular that this design focuses on for fault toler-
ance. A watchdog that runs on the primary node, watching for the application
to crash or hang; in addition to a watchdog on the backup node that watches
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the primary node for crashes. If the primary node crashes or hangs, a restart
must be initiated on the primary node; when this is not possible, it must run
on the backup one. There are also tasks responsible for periodic checkpoints of
critical volatile application data, logging of client messages to the application,
and replication of the application’s persistent data. Moreover, there is a task
dedicated to recovery of the application to the most recent checkpoint, followed
by a re-execution of the message log and connecting the persistent data to the
backup node, if necessary.
All of these tasks designed have been specifically chosen so that they are
compatible with other fault tolerance programming methods that are typically
completed within the application itself, such as N-version programming.
Four different fault tolerance levels have been designed to enable the system
to select the necessary level of active protection mechanisms. The first level,
zero, has none of the tasks running and thus a crash or hang may result in an
unknown amount of time for a restart, depending on when it occurs. Level one
adds the capability for crash detection and automatic restart, to speed up fault
detection and thus recovery. In the next level, periodic checkpointing is added
so that volatile data consistency can be achieved between restarts. Level three
goes a step further to add nonvolatile data consistency, as well. The last state,
number four, guarantees continuous operation, essentially requiring replication of
the application process to insure no delays on a failure.
7.1.2 Watchdog
The watchdog, watchd, is implemented as a daemon process that watches the life
of the application process by sending an empty signal to the it and verifying that a
connection was established. If this fails, a second attempt is made after a timeout
specified by the application on initialization of the watchdog. If this also fails,
the process is determined to be hung and action is taken. There is also another
mechanism for watching the application, which requires a heartbeat message to
be sent regularly to the watchdog. Failure with this method is indicated when
the heartbeat has not been received in the anticipated period. The downside of
this method is that watchd cannot differentiate between a hung process and a
very slow one.
Upon failure detection, the watchdog is responsible for recovering the applica-
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tion either to its initial state, or to the last checkpoint, depending on the level of
fault tolerance enabled. Watchd is also responsible for configuring the application
to re-execute all of its messages when that feature is in use. Lastly, the watchdog
watches itself and is able to recover itself from a software failure.
7.1.3 Fault Tolerance Library
The library libft is a set of C functions accessible to user-level applications that
provide capabilities such as data checkpointing and recovery, message logging,
and exception handling.
Functions are used to allow the application programmer to specify which
volatile data is critical so that the library can place them in a reserved region
of virtual memory and also regularly checkpoint the value. This implementation
minimizes the overhead by only checkpointing the critical values, rather than all
of the volatile data. In order to enable message re-execution, the fault toler-
ance implementation of these functions also saves the messages into a file as they
are read and written by the application. The other components, like the excep-
tion handling, are implemented in macros and standard C library functions to
maximize portability. The entire library has been successfully ported to various
UNIX-based operating systems.
7.1.4 Multi-Dimensional File System
The multi-dimensional file system enables the replication of critical non-volatile
data by allowing users to specify files that get replicated and placed on backup
systems, in real time. The implementation is transparent to the application
developer because it functions by intercepting file system calls and modifies their
behavior to propagate the data to backup file systems. It also utilizes the watchd
and libft, primarily so that failures can be detected by the watchdog and remain
transparent to the user.
7.1.5 Results
By using the fault tolerance features that were designed, up to the third level of
software fault tolerance was able to be provided, where detection, checkpointing,
replication, and restart and recovery were all utilized. While the application was
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live, an overhead of less than 14% was expected. Both the local and remote (neigh-
boring node) detection and recovery features were successfully demonstrated.
7.1.6 Analysis
This papers goals of providing a transparent fault tolerance solution very much
align with the new architecture. Some of techniques proposed have been designed
into the PolySat system, particularly the software watchdog and error logging in-
terface. The implementation of these are similar, as well: the watchdog also exists
as a static process within the system and the error logging interface is provided
by a common library. However, their system architecture has the capability to
provide a backup watchdog on an entirely other system, but that is not feasible
with a single CubeSat, at least at this time. Their library also provides a number
of other features, such as checkpointing, which may be implemented in a limited
sense for the PolySat system in the future, but currently does not exist in a strict
sense.
A number of other worthwhile mechanisms are discussed this paper and al-
though some rely on backup hardware, the multi-dimensional file system and
checkpointing features could be considered for future revisions of this software
architecture.
7.2 Software Fault Tolerance: a Tutorial
This tutorial for software fault tolerance was published by NASA in 2000 and
covers a wide variety of fault tolerance techniques [38]. These techniques are
divided into two distinct groups: single and multi-version. The single version
methods are focused on because they are most relevant to this thesis, due to the
significant man hours and training required to implement most multi version fault
tolerance mechanisms.
7.2.1 Single-Version Software Fault Tolerance Techniques
The first primary technique for fault tolerance discussed is partitioning, which
provides isolation between ”functionally independent modules.” The two types of
partitioning are horizontal and vertical, specifying the dimension of the hierarchy
90
7.2 NASA’s Software Fault Tolerance: a Tutorial
of the architecture. With horizontal partitioning, each software function is sepa-
rated into independently executing modules who communicate through interfaces
to ”control modules” that are solely responsible for coordinating the execution of
these functions. The top-down hierarchy of a vertically partitioned architecture
places most of the control functions at the highest level and most of the actual
processing occurs at the low level. The stated advantages of using a partitioned
architecture are ”simplified testing, easier maintenance, and lower propagation of
side effects.”
System closure is the next principle suggested, which states that all actions
require explicit authorization. In order to achieve this, each component of the
system must not have any more permissions than are necessary for completing its
function. The reason for this policy is that errors are much more easily handled
if their chance of propagating and thus creating more damage is limited. In
a closed system all of the interactions are known and this makes positioning
and determining the required error detection checks much simpler. On the other
hand, in a more open system with respect to capabilities, a ”damaged capability”
can result in an unintended execution and therefore unexpected complications
between modules.
The next aspect of single-version software fault tolerance approached is error
detection. it’s proposed that all structural modules should have two basic prop-
erties: self-protection and self-checking. A component with self-protection can
detect errors in the information passed to it from other components; whereas one
with self-checking can detect internal errors and prevent them from propagat-
ing to other components. In order to determine the appropriate amount of both
of these properties, consideration of functionality, performance, complexity, and
safety need to be made in the design process.
A number of different error detection checks are proposed for use. The checks
are replication, timing, reversal, coding, reasonableness, and structural checks.
Replication utilizes redundant components and compares the outputs of each to
determine errors. Timing checks are relevant to modules and systems with specific
timing requirements, such as deadlines. It is possible to use these known require-
ments for error checking; an example would be a watchdog timer. A reversal
check is where the output of a component is used to compute the corresponding
input, and then verify that this calculated input match the actual input. Coding
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checks use redundant information included with data in order to aid with error
detection. A commonly used type of coding check are checksums. The reason-
ableness check uses established properties of the data to detect errors, such as
ranges or rates. Lastly, structural checks uses properties of the data structures for
error checking. This type of check is most effective when data structures provide
redundant information to enable various types of structural checks.
The final, briefly discussed, fault detection device mentioned is run-time checks.
Typically, these are provided standard within hardware systems for issues such
as divide by zero, overflow, and underflow.
7.2.2 Multi-version Software Fault Tolerance Techniques
Multi-version software fault tolerance is used by implementing more than one
version of a certain piece of software, which can then be executed in serial or
parallel, to reduce the chance of errors. There are multiple ways that this method
can be used, such as an alternative configuration, and in pairs or groups. The
driving force behind this fault tolerance method is that if each version of the
software is implemented independently and differently, they will have different
failure modes. Thus, if one implementation is prone to fail with a certain input,
hopefully one of the other versions will not.
7.2.3 Applied Techniques
The entirety of the relevant techniques mentioned in this technical paper were
from the single-version software fault tolerance section due to multi-version being
far too cumbersome and complex to implement for the PolySat system. However,
a large number of these single-version properties were designed into the system.
The basic software architecture utilizes both horizontal and vertical partition-
ing. It is horizontal in that each software function is distributed into its own
process and communication is done via the kernel through sockets. It is also ver-
tically partitioned in that the high level processes are fairly simple and heavily
rely on underlying code, the abstraction libraries, to do a significant amount of
the work.
The principle of system closure has also been used in the ground-to-spacecraft
command system of the PolySat design with the addition of the signatures on
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important commands to ensure that only authorized users or systems can modify
the state of the spacecraft.
In regards to the error detection checks, a number of these are also being
utilized. For example, the software watchdog relies on timing checks and rea-
sonableness checks in process to ensure that the other processes execute at their
known, intended rate. Furthermore, coding checks are used in various places in
the system: every packet from the ground station and all UDP inter-process mes-
sages have a checksum included, also a SHA-256 hash is used for the command
signature to validate data integrity, in addition to security properties.
The multi-version philosophy would ideally be applied for the software watch-
dog in the future because it is one of the most critical components in the system.
However, the additional effort required to implement this was out of the scope
and timeline of this current design.
7.3 Flexible Fault Tolerance in Configurable Middleware
for Embedded Systems
This paper proposes the MicroQoSCORBA (MQC) middleware for embedded
distributed systems with a variety of configurable fault tolerance mechanisms [39].
By providing the capabilities through a middleware, the ties to specific hardware
are removed and increase the options for code reuse. Furthermore, by enabling
customization of the different mechanisms, this solution can be tailored precisely
to fit the needs of both the application and hardware platform.
7.3.1 Configurable Fault-Tolerant Mechanisms
The designers of MQC decided the following mechanisms would be of most use in
their embedded distributed system targets: temporal redundancy, spatial redun-
dancy, value redundancy, and reliability provided through group communication
and failure detection.
The first mechanism, temporal redundancy, consists of executing an operation
as many times as necessary to produce the desired result. MQC implements this
for communication channels, in particular, allowing the user to specify a number
of automatic retransmissions. This option is selected in the pre-configuration of
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the middleware. The implementation of this mechanism also insures that only
unique messages are serviced by keeping track of unique message identifiers.
The next mechanism is spatial redundancy, which is where there are several
copies of the same component. This mechanism is also implemented in relation
to communications, though specifically the path through which messages are
transmitted. This feature enables the user to specify a variety of communication
paths that are handled through the same high level abstraction and also uses the
same unique message identifiers as in the temporal redundancy so that duplicate
messages are ignored in a client. Unfortunately, the same is not true for the server
end, where custom code would be necessary to detect duplicate messages.
The final redundancy mechanism, value, adds extra information about the
data being stored or sent, typically for improvement in error detection capabilities.
This mechanism has been added to the communication chain so that a checksum is
calculated and included with each sent message, and validated upon each received
message. This feature is also selectable at the pre-configuration stage.
The first of the reliability mechanisms is group communication, which is de-
fined as “a means for provided multi-point to multi-point communication, by
organizing processes in groups.” Messages are sent to groups via the associated
names and all group members receive the messages sent to it. Five different
types of messaging are provided: non-uniform failure-atomic, dynamically uni-
form failure-atomic, FIFO ordered, causal ordered, and totally ordered multicast.
The specific type of messaging can be chosen once again in the configuration of
the system and are provided so that the user can customize the needs of the
middleware to their specific needs.
The final mechanism, reliability via failure detection, covers a wide variety of
features including any mechanism that can be used for the detection and diag-
nosing of failed system components. This feature is specifically provided through
the capability of communication timeouts, which will allow the system to moni-
tor the health of a communication group and remove members who are failing to
communicate properly.
7.3.2 Results
A server and client was implemented with each of the mechanisms, and the mem-
ory footprint and execution times were compared to a base implementation within
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a few different systems, including Linux.
Most of the overhead occurred on the server, within Linux, side: spatial redun-
dancy approximately an additional 20 KB and the group communication nearly
doubled the size, due to a custom transport implementation, while temporal and
value redundancy added negligible amounts. With the client, all features required
negligible additional memory except for spatial redundancy, which added almost
10 KB.
Execution times also were affected by the fault tolerance mechanisms. As
one can imagine, with temporal redundancy, the execution time scaled fairly lin-
early with the number of additional re-transmissions. More interesting is that the
spatial redundancy increased the execution time by almost 85% when using two
communication channels and the value redundancy mechanism added more than
25% extra run time due to the checksum calculation. With the group communi-
cation, the execution times varied wildly based on the size of the group and the
particular algorithm used, but the minimum execution overhead was shown to
be more than 100%. This was explained by the sending of multiple messages to
all group members and shown in the results since the times scaled approximately
linearly based on the number of group members.
7.3.3 Analysis
Although the target of this middleware is distributed embedded systems in partic-
ular, many of the concepts are still applicable to independently operating Cube-
Sats. The idea of implementing a flexible middleware is very evident in the
new PolySat software architecture, although the shared libraries provide common
functionality in addition to fault tolerant features, since it is intended specifically
for CubeSat development. Although there are no specific capabilities like the
reliable group communication mechanism mostly because Linux provides a very
robust implementation of inter-process communications, the new software archi-
tecture is very amenable to such additions in the future if necessary because they
can be added to the library, transparent to the user processes.
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7.4 Great Watchdogs, Version 1.2
7.4.1 Technical Report Summary
“Great Watchdogs” is a technical report about different watchdog techniques,
written by a long-time embedded engineer. He argues that watchdogs are integral
parts of our system after citing aerospace projects who succeeded and failed
thanks to watchdogs (or the lack thereof, respectively) [40]. He continues by
plainly stating: “A Watchdog Timer (WDT) is an important line of defense in
making reliable products”. The bulk of the report is a discussion and survey of a
number of different watchdog timer approaches: internal (to the CPU), external,
and software. He also details the characteristics of “Great WDTs” and safe
watchdog usage practices.
The survey of internal watchdog timers includes a number of variants from
Motorola to Toshiba parts, all packaged with common microprocessors. It is
argued that at bare minimum internal WDTs should be able to reset the proces-
sor. Other indicated favorable features include an external signal when watchdog
resets occur, requiring multiple writes to “tap” the watchdog, and write-once
watchdog control registers. The author also suggests other requirements that
may be difficult to find in an internal watchdog, and thus continues to discuss
external watchdogs that do provide these options.
A smaller number of external watchdogs are surveyed, but two primary vari-
ants of the external watchdog are discussed: simple and windowed. Ganssle
dismisses the simpler watchdogs, which are isolated from the primary clock, yet
have no strict timing requirements for being tapped. The more preferred option is
the windowed external watchdog, where a reset will be triggered when the WDT
input is toggled “too slowly, too fast, or not at all”, which accounts for more
failure modes.
Following the survey of good and bad hardware watchdogs, there is a discus-
sion of characteristics of good watchdog timers. The author poses the CPU as a
threat to the system whenever it is in a glitch state and suggests that especially
watchdogs who utilize a non-maskable interrupt instead of resetting the CPU are
not sufficient, due to trusting that the CPU can still execute the interrupt service
routine. Furthermore, the “effective watchdog” should not be connected to the
clock of the CPU either, given that this may fail and then cause both devices to
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not function properly. This excludes internal watchdogs because they typically
internally hard-wired to share the same clock as the CPU. The characteristics
are sufficient for finding the ideal watchdog, but there likely situations where the
engineer desires to utilize internal WDT on their CPU.
Also provided are a series of guidelines for use of an internal WDT, so that
it provides maximum utility, despite some of the aforementioned downfalls. Two
primary design rules are suggested: tap the watchdog after the code has numer-
ous, separate verifiably correct executions, and insure that it is not possible to
incidentally tap the watchdog (i.e. as a result of erroneous instruction memory).
The developer is urged to be incredibly paranoid when programming with the
watchdog timer by considering all possible modes of failure. Furthermore, it’s
recommended that any tapping of the watchdog is done inside a program’s main
loop rather than an ISR, which can still run while all other code has crashed. The
last suggestion for using internal watchdogs is that it’s important to make sure
an external signal is generated upon reset, for resetting all external peripherals.
Although an internal watchdog can be useful, it’s stated that the optimal
watchdog does not have to rely on a processor or its software. This means that
an external watchdog should be used, if it can be afforded in board space. Rather
than selecting a watchdog specific component, a very cheap microcontroller can
be used, which contains many built-in peripherals for constructing a very ro-
bust watchdog timer. The software on these type of watchdogs should be very
simplistic and they can be interfaced with in the same manner as an internal
watchdog.
Selecting watchdog hardware is very important and in an ideal situation the
guidance above for tapping the watchdog would be sufficient. However, most
complex embedded environments involve multitasking where the simple tapping
methods are not sufficient. Thus, mechanisms specifically for multitasked envi-
ronments are proposed.
First, the interactions with the watchdog must be isolated to a single task to
reduce chances of unintended tapping. Inside of this task will be a data structure
with an integer entry for each task. This integer needs to be incremented each
time the task starts, or it can be incremented every time a task’s main loop
is completed, if the task is persistent. It is important that these values are
incremented atomically, which can be done simply with semaphores.
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Periodically, the watchdog task should scan the data structure to ensure that
the values inside are reasonable (on a task-by-task basis). The rate at which the
scanning occurs must be chosen based on the frequency of the tasks, to ensure
that a majority of the tasks will have run in that time. To account for tasks
that are not periodic, a min and max value can be used to check the value in the
data structure rather than a hard-calculated value. In order to discern what min
and max are appropriate, the watchdog can be configured to run in an alternate
“debug” mode during testing, to observe and record the actual values in the
watchdog task’s data structure.
7.4.2 Watchdogs in the PolySat System
Watchdogs are a vital part of the PolySat system’s fault tolerance. Both internal
and external hardware watchdogs are in use, for ease of use and ensured protec-
tion, respectively. In regards to the software watchdog, the concept has drawn
heavily from this technical report. The PolySat software watchdog exists in it’s
own process, as to be isolated from the majority of the system, and it is the only
code that touches the external watchdog interface, as suggested by this technical
report. Furthermore, it utilizes a very similar data structure to track the count
of major events executed on each process and uses min/max values to validate
these counts.
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8.1 Overall Design Success
This new CubeSat software architecture has been specifically designed to provide
PolySat with a system that can help the entire organization support a wide
variety of missions and do it in a minimal amount of time. The use of Linux
and the emphasis on modularity have been exploited since the early stages of its
implementation; over ten different students have participated in developing for
this software system, some of whom were only second year students. Furthermore,
the use of Linux has also helped increase new mission potential, thanks to a
variety of open source drivers for cameras and other payload related software
that is available for Unix-type systems. This support has also been shown in
this design to enable a number of features that were previously very difficult or
impossible to implement, such as the digital command signing. Hopefully this is
a continued trend for future revisions because there are a large number of features
that can be added to the software architecture that take advantage of open source
and other existing Linux resources.
The experience that has been gained during my three year tenure as a PolySat
member has also been exceedingly valuable for developing this new software ar-
chitecture. It has resulted in numerous contributions, such as the telemetry
gathering and command capabilities, that would have been very difficult to de-
rive as guidelines without extensive exposure to and usage of the first generation
PolySat software system. It is hoped that by leveraging this experience, future
members of PolySat will be encouraged to use this system and continue utilizing
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it for a significant amount of time.
Lastly, it is hoped that the lifespan of the CubeSat in orbit should also be dra-
matically increased thanks to the new fault tolerance mechanisms. The hierarchy
of watchdogs will insure that the system can recover from radiation events, pre-
venting the system from staying in an ineffective state, and the digital command
signing will prevent unauthorized access to vital commands, insuring the mission
is not compromised. Although the absolute overhead of these components may
seem like a lot, it has been made relatively insignificant thanks to the comput-
ing power and increased link speed capabilities of the new hardware platform.
Regardless, it is a small price to pay to provide further guarantees of mission
success.
8.2 Implementation Progress
The implementation of the new software architecture is currently one of the high-
est priorities of PolySat’s software team. As of May 2011, the entire custom
library has been completed and is available to developers for use on their per-
sonal computers for testing, in addition to the custom platform, when hardware
interfacing is required. Additionally, all of the primary functionality of the bea-
con, watchdog, system manager, and communication processes have been demon-
strated. The data logger process is still in progress, but minimum functionality
is due to be completed by June 2011. The current goal is to have an engineering
model of the system by June, which appears to be feasible at the current rate of
progress.
8.3 Future Work
There is a nearly endless amount of future work thanks to the capabilities of this
new platform, both in hardware and software. These concepts discussed are ones
that are beneficial to the road map of PolySat and the CubeSat community as a
whole.
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8.3.1 Open Source Libraries
After the custom libraries are finalized, there is significant interest in open sourc-
ing, to encourage and enable other universities to employ similar systems in their
CubeSats. Both PolySat and the CubeSat community could benefit from this:
PolySat could obtain more feedback from the additional users of the software,
to further improve and test the libraries, and the community can leverage these
libraries to form the basis of a similar platform, without necessitating the signif-
icant experience that was leveraged to design it.
8.3.2 Radio Communication Optimization
Although this design has increased the overhead of communications by utilizing
UDP/IP and digital signatures, the system has also enabled various optimiza-
tions to communications that could reduce this cost. The communication process
(Section 4.2.2) is readily accepting of header compression, which could poten-
tially reduce the overhead of the UDP/IP header to a single byte, as proposed in
several RFCs, such as RFC 3095 [41].
Additionally, as discussed in the design of the communication process, the
AX.25 protocol has a fairly unreasonable overhead, due to a number of necessary
fields that are unused or sub-optimal in satellite communications. Thus, the ideal
solution would be to completely re-design the satellite communication protocol,
to optimize for efficiency. The infrastructure for this type of solution already
exists on both the satellite and some ground station efforts, but would need to
extend to the radio transmission components, as well.
8.3.3 Scheduler Power Management
The event handler, as discussed in Section 4.3.1, is the core of all processes and
forces them to block, when inactive. This feature can be readily exploited to
increase the power efficiency of the processor, by entering a lower power state.
Using a mechanism like Google’s WakeLocks [42], the scheduler could be modified
to only keep the system awake when a process is doing useful work (e.g. inside
of a callback function). Preliminary investigations of the savings potential have
shown the processor can save 20 mW (about 10% of idle consumption) or more
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by entering a lower power state. The less power the avionics system requires, the
more it can be used for running payload operations.
8.3.4 Multi-Version Software Watchdog
In order for the system to be robust to failures of the watchdog in addition to
the standard processes, two software watchdogs should be running in parallel so
that they can watch each other. This avoids relying on the internal watchdog
to watch the software watchdog, as is done with the current system. In order to
effectively implement this, an additional independent software watchdog needs
to be implemented to the same specifications as the existing one. That way,
both software watchdogs could watch all of the processes, including each other,
and the reaction to a failure inside of the watchdog would be both more efficient
and faster, as discussed in the watchdog limitations (Section 5.2.8). This is a
difficult task because in order to be truly independent, the second watchdog must
be developed without the utilization of the custom libraries, which is the reason
it was not included for this current design.
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PolySat Coding Standard
This is the C coding standard that has been used for the previous software system
development and will be continued to be used by the new one.
Originally compiled and updated by: Kyle Leveque, Keith McCabe, Dave
Cuddeback, and Jason Anderson.
A.1 Indentation
A.1.1 Number of Spaces Per Tab
There should be 4 spaces set per tab. To set this configuration in MPLab go to
“Edit”, “Properties...”, “Tabs” and set “tab size” to 4; also set to “insert spaces”.
A.1.2 Curly-Brace Location
Curly-braces should be placed at the end of the same line on which an if-statement,
while, struct, etc that the brace applies to. Functions should still have the opening
brace on a new line.
A.1.3 Maximum Line Length
No line should be longer than 80 columns.
A.1.4 If-Statements
One line if-statements should still be indented and also have curly-braces.
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A.1.5 Break Up Code
Uses blank lines where appropriate to break up the code and group statements
together.
A.2 Identifiers
A.2.1 Single Letter Variable Names
Single letter variable names are only allowed in for-loops and the only acceptable
single letter variable names are i, j, and k. Additionally, i, j, and k must be used
as the increment variables in for-loops.
A.2.2 Multiple Word Variable Names
In multiple word variable names, the first letter of the first word must be lowercase
and all following words should begin with an uppercase letter. Underscores should
not be used at any time.
A.2.3 Abbreviations
If you use an abbreviation for a term, be sure to use that same abbreviation in
the rest of the code.
A.2.4 Hungarian Notation
Do not use Hungarian Notation, which prefixes all variable names with a letter
representing their type.
A.2.5 Variable Name Length
Variable names should be neither excessively long nor too short; use reasonable
judgment.
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A.3 Constants
A.3.1 Magic Numbers
Do not use “magic numbers” in your code. A magic number is any number other
than 0, 1, -1, and occasionally 2.
A.3.2 Use
Constants should be declared as “#define”s. Do not use “const” to declare con-
stants.
A.3.3 Constant Naming
Constants should be named in all uppercase with underscores separating the
words.
A.4 Source Files
A.4.1 Contents
C files should contain only functions. The only “#include” allowed is for the file’s
corresponding header file.
A.4.2 Description
Each source file should include a brief description of what the source file does,
any specific external documents that will be referenced in function headers and/or
comments (and where to locate those documents), the author’s name, and the
date the file has last been updated.
A.4.3 Function Headers
This section explains how to document C code. Always use 4 spaces instead
of tabs. Line up all params and retval in a table like fashion using tabs. The
whitespace distance between the name and the description should be greater than
one space. Follow the following examples.
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Last Updated: 7/19/07
David Cuddeback
Jason Anderson
This is a file comment which should be listed at the top of every file.
/**
* @file cdh-comm.c C&DH comm code.
*
* This is the comm code.
*
* @author Chris Noe <cnoe@calpoly.edu>
*/
This is a global variable and a #define comment.
/**
* This is the number of tries to deploy the antennas.
*/
This is a method comment.
/**
* This a brief. Sentence 2.
* Enable the selected comm system by setting SEL_RF
*
* @bug This function does not work.
*
* @deprecated This function is not Y2K.
*
* @todo Fix me.
*
* @param comm Select which comm system to enable (COMM_A_ENABLE
* or COMM_B_ENABLE)
* @param comm2 This is about
*
* @return An error code.
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*
* @retval OK Okay.
* @retval ERR_I2C Error during I2C transmission.
*
* @author Bill Gates <bgates@microsoft.com>
*/
A.5 Header Files
A.5.1 Structure
Header files should have their sections organized in the following order:
• #include’s
• General #define’s
• Debugging #define’s
• “struct”, “union”, and “enum” definitions
• Global variables
• Function Prototypes
A.5.2 Header File Exclusion
Every header file should begin with:
#ifndef _HEADERFILENAME_H
#define _HEADERFILENAME_H
#endif
A.6 Comments
A.6.1 Style
All single line comments should use the “//”-style comments rather than the
single lined “/* */”-style comments. Comments that are large blocks may use
the “/* */”-style comments.
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A.6.2 Flow Control
Every “for”, “while”, “if”, “else”, and “switch” should have a comment explaining
the purpose of the control structure.
A.6.3 Microcontroller Specific Instructions
Every instruction involving a microcontroller specific instruction should have a
comment explaining what is being done and possibly where the action can be ref-
erenced in an external document (such as the microcontroller’s datasheet). Some
examples of microcontroller specific instructions include setting special registers,
accessing pins, etc.
A.6.4 General Instructions
Every instruction or group of instructions that form a significant operation should
be commented. Another programmer should be able to read through your com-
ments without reading a single line of code and know exactly what your code
does and how it does it.
A.7 Horizontal Whitespace
A.7.1 Keywords and Commas
Always put a space after each comma; never before a comma or semi-colon. Also
put a space around each keyword such as “while”, “for”, and “if”.
A.7.2 Operators
Put spaces around operators when appropriate. Make large expressions as read-
able as possible (and parenthesis do not hurt either).
A.7.3 Between Functions
Make sure to break up functions with a couple blank lines after each function and
also a space after local variable declarations.
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A.7.4 Function Names
There should be no spaces between the function name and opening parenthesis,
after the opening parenthesis, or before the closing parenthesis.
A.8 Functions
A.8.1 Local Variables
Always put the local variable declarations at the top of the function. The MPLab
compiler makes you do this anyways, so if you manage to break this rule you get
bonus points and non-compiling code. However, the VisualDSP++ compiler does
let you break this rule, so watch out.
A.8.2 Error Handling
All functions should return a char. Functions return “no error” value on success
and an “error code” value on failure. This is only required for functions that
either access hardware or call a function that accesses hardware (recursive).
A.8.3 Parameters
The first parameters are the input variables and the last parameters are the
pointers to the output variables for all functions. (Unless error handling is not
required, then no output pointer variable would be needed.)
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Appendix B
PolySat Formal Code Review
Process
A formal code review process had been established for the previous generation
flight software and will also be used for the new software. It may be revised in
the future to be better suited to the new development process.
CPX Software Inspection Process
[adapted from Dr. John Dalbeys process]
Updated 3/28/06 Kyle & Keith
Created 5/26/04 - Kyle
B.1 Work Product
• Must compile without error
• Resides in Polysat/Software/Projects in repository
• Contains line numbers
• No longer than 250 lines total
B.2 Participants
• Author (Code Monkey)
• Moderator (also an inspector)
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• An inspector
• Optional Additional inspectors (can also be outside of the software team)
B.3 Preparing for Inspection
• The author must alert the inspectors via email 48hrs before the code review
takes place
• The inspectors will download the source code off of SVN
• Each inspector must print out all the source code in a monospaced font
• Each inspector must fill out an Inspection Preparation Log form
• Each inspector must obtain the Coding Standards
• Each inspector must also obtain any other relevant documents (datasheets,
design diagrams, etc)
• Each inspector must record their starting time after completing the above
items but before reviewing the actual code.
• In one continuous sitting, inspect each line of code, record any defects, and
make notes of any questions or unclear code.
• Each inspector should inspect at a pace of 70 to 120 Lines of Code per hour.
• Each inspector should fill out and bring an Inspection Preparation Log to
the meeting.
B.4 Meeting
• Only the author, the moderator, and the inspectors attend the meeting; no
upper management.
• All inspectors bring their marked source code and their Inspection Prepa-
ration Log
• Time limit is 2 hours.
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• Purpose is to identify defects and consolidate issues; not to discuss solutions
or design.
• The moderator leads the meeting; he directs attention to each section of
code and solicits issues.
• Inspectors contribute issues from their Inspection Preparation Logs and
those issues are evaluated to determine if they are defects or not.
• The author is only present to obtain feedback; not to present, explain, or
defend code.
• The moderator and author both create an Inspection Defect Log.
• The moderators will be posted on the website; the authors will be used to
make any corrections to his code.
• These defects are not entered into the defect tracking system as they have
never been submitted as final in SVN.
• All marked source code from each inspector is submitted to the author (so
trivial defects do not need to be logged).
• The code will be assigned by the moderator an accepted, accepted with
minor rework, not accepted, or review incomplete status at the end of the
meeting in the Software Inspection Report.
B.5 Rework
• There must be no severe defects, less than 3 minor defects, and less than 10
trivial defects for acceptance.
• If the product was not accepted, all defects causing a non-acceptance must
be re-worked by the author and another inspection scheduled.
• If the product was accepted but a couple minor and some trivial defects
remain, the author must fix those defects before committing the code to as
final in SVN. However, no further reviews are required.
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B.6 Follow-Up
• The moderator decides if any follow-up is necessary.
• The author lets the moderator know via email when the necessary changes
have been completed. The moderator gets the latest code off of SVN and
checks against the Inspection Defect Log to verify if the changes were made.
• The moderator amends the Software Inspection Report to show which de-
fects have been corrected and to update the status of the report.
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